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1. Introduction  
During the last decade Social Capital has been a vividly debated theme in social sciences 
and for good reason. Cooperation based on mutual trust is undoubtedly an intrinsic part of a 
well functioning society. Though not the first to use the label of Social Capital’, Robert 
Putnam’s study of democracy in Italy, ‘Democracy Works’ 1993, was the starting point for 
a wide array of Social Capital research, explaining everything from why Swedish National 
Tax Board manages to collect 98.7% of all taxes while their Russian counterpart only 
manages to collect 24% of all taxes1, to why Palermo taxis don’t use the radio control centre 
and to why Americans nowadays ‘bowl alone’. Besides academics, Prime ministers and 
Presidents have also found Social Capital important since it is believed to the remedy for 
modern societal alienation.  
The Social Capital debate has, since Putnam’s investigation of America in Bowling Alone 
(2000), been focusing on changes in society that supposedly has made humans less trusting 
and more alienated. Putnam’s findings expose a marked decline in Americans, ‘time spent 
with neighbors’, organizational activity etc. during the last 30 years. Putnam’s American 
investigation leaves the impression that modernization per se is detrimental to Social 
Capitaland that we now are less trusting and more alienated than ever before. However, 
investigations on Social Capital in Sweden (Rothstein 2001), the Netherlands (De Hart and 
Dekker 1999) and Japan (Inoguchi, 2000) show stable or rising levels of Social Capital, 
indicating that a decline in Social Capital is not a global trend. Despite these inconsistent 
research results the consensus among academics, politicians and policymakers is that Social 
Capital evaporates as societies modernize.  
 
Given the multitude of different interpretations of Social Capital, the question arises to what 
extent America, Europe and Japan actually differs in terms of trend in Social Capital, or 
whether the disparity in research results is due to different interpretations or understandings 
of Social Capital,   that emphasizes different groups of people or different settings.   
-A communitarian understanding of Social Capital, emphasizing ‘Particularized trust’, in 
local community. ‘Particularized trust’ is trust between people who know each other, based 
on face- to-face relations and direct reciprocity.  
                                                 
1 That is 98.7 and. 24% of taxes on registered incomes, hence excluding the ‘black’ and ‘gray’ parts of the economy. 
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-A macro level understanding of Social Capital, emphasizing ‘Generalized trust’ among 
strangers in society. ‘Generalized trust’ is trust based on the notion that most people can be 
trusted, and if any, indirect reciprocity.  
 
In this thesis I will emphasize the division between these to understandings of Social 
Capital. I also suggest that modernization has two completely different effects on the two 
dimensions of Social Capital. My hypothesis is that modernization is detrimental to Social 
Capital based on ‘Particularized trust’ and beneficial to Social Capital based on 
‘Generalized trust’.  
I consider four aspects of modernization to be the most important in relation to trust:  
 -Material needs satisfaction 
- Reduced dependence of family and kin 
-Increased reliance on the state and society 
-Secularization 
These structural aspects of modernization are considered conducive to ‘Generalized trust’ 
and detrimental to ‘Particularized trust’.  
I also assume that ‘none structural’ aspects of modernization affect trust.  
-Equality of income and equality of opportunity. 
-Just and fair institutions. 
- A successful integration of immigrants 
 
While the intermediate variables are linked to modernization they are dependent on 
political, institutional or cultural factors and are hence not understood as an integral part of 
modernization. 
 
Analyzing the comprehensive cross country survey on human values, the World Values 
Survey, and other country statistics, my intention is to find out whether there exists a 
relationship between modernization and trust. 
 
1.1 Research questions, hypotheses and outline   
The theme of this thesis is the effect of modernization on trust. Formulated as research 
questions: -To what extent can modernization explain differences in levels of trust among 
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populations in different countries and differences among individuals? -To what extent can 
political or cultural factors such as equality and fairness of institutions explain variance of 
trust between populations from different countries and among individuals?  
My hypotheses are: 
 -H1; Modernization is beneficial to Social Capital understood as ‘Generalized trust’. Trust 
between people without personal relations increases at the societal level. 
-H2; Modernization is detrimental to Social Capital understood as ‘Particularized trust’. 
Trust within neighborhoods, local communities and family and kin decreases.  
-H3: The effect of modernization on ‘Particularized trust’ and ‘Generalized trust’ is 
strengthened if modernization is accompanied with increased equality, just and fair 
institutions, a successful integration of immigrants and extensive welfare programs. These 
intermediate variables accentuate the effect of modernization on ‘Generalized’ and 
‘Particularized trust’. While hypotheses H1 and H2 propose a direct effect from 
modernization to trust, H3 takes four intermediate variables into account. The intermediate 
variables that can be expected to explain variance among equally modernized countries. The 
intermediate variables are linked to or correlated with modernization but will be analyzed 
separately since they to a large extent are conditional to cultural, institutional or political 
factors.  
The effect of modernization on trust 
 
   Structural variables        
     Social Capital 
 
 
 
        Intermediate political  
         or cultural variables 
or cultural variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-’Generalized  trust’ 
 
-’Particularized trust’  
-Material needs satisfaction  
-Secularization  
-Reduced dependence on 
family and kin and increased 
reliance on the state thru; 
-Urbanization 
-Diversification of workforce’  
-Defamilization -Equality  
-Fairness of judicial 
institutions 
-Quality and quantity of    
welfare programs    
-Immigrant integration 
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After this introduction and research outline follows chapter 2 reviewing the concept of 
Social Capital and two opposing schools of Social Capital; the communitarian and the 
macro level centered. In chapter 2.5, I analyze ambiguities in the mainstream 
communitarian Social Capital theory. The analysis of the ambiguities of Social Capital 
theory, forms the basis of the definition of Social Capital as a two-dimensional concept. In 
chapter 3.2, I explain the function of modernization relevant to my hypotheses; increased 
dependence on society, decreased dependence on family and kin, material needs satisfaction 
and secularization.  
 
In chapter 3.3, I analyze the function of my intermediate variables: equality, institutional 
quality and immigrant integration in advanced industrial countries.   
In the methodology chapter 4, I explain why a two folded approach, analyzing both 
individual and country level data, is chosen. My choice of operationalizations of the 
dependent and the independent variables are described and explained in chapter 4.2. In 
chapter 4.3 I discuss the methodological problems using survey data. In chapter A statistical 
test of the hypotheses is conducted in chapter 5.  
 
-An individual level approach, statistically analyzing a possible link between trust and 
modernization at an individual level. Data for the individual level analysis is primarily from 
the World Values Survey.  
 
-A macro level approach, statistically analyzing a possible link between trust and 
modernization at a macro/ country level. 
 Data for the country level analysis is primarily official country statistics collected by e.g. 
UNDP and OECD.  
Since the two folded statistical analysis might be difficult to comprehend, a summary of all 
findings relevant to each hypothesis ends chapter 5 
Conclusions are drawn in chapter 6.      
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2. The theory of Social Capital 
2.1 Introduction 
Social Capital has as a popular concept drawn attention from all disciplines of social 
sciences. The popularity of the theme has indeed been enriching but its popularity has also 
led to a multitude of ambiguous definitions and some confusion of what Social Capital 
’actually’ is. Though most scholars agree that a core element in Social Capital is; the asset 
that comes from trusting other trustworthy individuals within a group, whether a local 
community or a whole society.2 Social Capital is described as both the glue, as in getting 
people together, and the oil of society, as in reducing the friction of cooperation (Putnam 
2003:23). Groups with strong Social Capital are assumed to have fewer ’free riders’ and 
more trusting individuals and hence enhanced possibilities to solve or at least relieve ‘the 
problem of communal action’, mutual problems that might be solved if everyone trust each 
others willingness to cooperate (Fukuyama 2000:6f, Putnam 1993:chap.6, Rothstein 
2003a:82f). The tragedy of the commons (Elinor Ostrom) or social traps are other concepts 
to describe these enduring societal problems. Bo Rothstein explains the logic of the ‘social 
trap’;  
‘If everybody cooperates everybody wins. If you don’t trust that everybody else also 
cooperates is it futile to cooperate since the end result is dependent on everybody’s 
cooperation. Thus is it rational not to cooperate if you are not certain that everybody 
else will cooperate. Conclusion: Efficient cooperation for public goods can only be 
attained if everybody trusts that everybody trusts. If trust is lacking the ‘social trap’ 
closes and everybody loses even though they realize that everybody would gain on 
cooperation’ (2003:45, Rothstein 2003a:153).  
 
Social Capital is thus decisive when the (i)rational self interest has negative consequences 
for society at large. In Social Capital studies there is a division between ‘communitarian’ 
scholars (Putnam et al.) and macro level centered scholars (Rothstein et al.) These schools 
differ both in heir focus of attention; emphasizes on community or the wider society, and in 
their explanation of how Social Capital is created. In broad terms communitarian scholars 
                                                 
2 Rose (1999) and Field (2003) goes even further and totally abolishes trust from the definition of Social Capital, then reducing the 
meaning of Social Capital to be a measurement of organizational activity.   
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focuses on social networks/ organizational activity and its beneficial effect on local 
community. In so far as the society level is mentioned, it is understood as an effect of the 
community level. Macro level scholars on the other hand who do not agree with Putnam’s 
definition of Social Capital, focuses on how government institutions create and nourishes 
‘Generalized trust’ at a societal level. While macro level centered scholars often exemplify 
Social Capital with civic mindedness e.g. willingness to pay income tax, communitarian 
scholars are more concerned with organizational activity as such.3   
 
2.2 Defining Social Capital as trust  
Due to the interdisciplinary popularity of Social Capital the concept has a number of 
different definitions, however many refer to manifestations of Social Capital rather than 
Social Capital as a norm. The established definition of Social Capital, refers to both 
manifestations and norms; “social networks, trust, norms and sanctions which eases 
cooperation in or among groups’, (Putnam,1993:167) and is criticized for being tautological 
(Rothstein 2003:95). It explains cooperative norms (Social Capital) by cooperation 
(organizational activity). Since Social Capital theory tries to grasp what facilitates 
cooperation, explaining cooperation by cooperation is arguably over simplistic. In other 
words, cooperation can not be both explanandum and explanans.  
 
In this thesis this thesis Social Capital is defined in accordance with the macro-level 
centered school as the norm of trust that promotes cooperation among people.  
The (social) ‘capital’ allegory derives from sociology and the idea of ‘Human’, ‘Physical’, 
‘Financial’ and ‘Social Capital’. The term ‘capital’ can however be misleading when we 
discuss Social Capital at a societal level since it foremost is a societal and not a personal 
good. It can also be argued that it is not trust ‘per se’ that is of interest but rather actual 
trustful behavior. Yet, I find the norm or the moral of trust a better indicator of Social 
Capital than actual trustworthiness for several reasons. First, the reason for not behaving 
untrustworthy or not ‘free riding’ might not be because of cooperative intentions but 
because of fear of getting caught and punished. With a rational choice perspective on Social 
                                                 
3 Due to the limitations of this thesis I choose not to give an account for the works of the French sociologist Pierre Bordieu. In his 
version Social Capital is foremost a personal good, related to the individual’s position in society, a personal asset derived from 
his/hers habitus, (similar to ’human capital’) rather than a societal good. Nor James Coleman who’s primary concern was the 
personal advantages of Social Capital. 
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Capital, interpreting Social Capital within the limitations of ‘self interest’, Social Capital 
becomes a form of utility-maximizing or law obedience that denounces every moral aspects 
of Social Capital, then reducing the meaning of Social Capital considerably. A totalitarian 
state might thru oppression promote an instrumental version of trustworthiness but 
totalitarian states do not promote Social Capital (see e.g. Dowley & Silver 2002:507ff). 
Though, not to rule out the importance of law and order, in a context of just and democratic 
institutions trustworthiness can work as an indication of Social Capital.  
 
Secondly, trustworthiness is relative to what you can afford losing. What individuals are 
willing to put at risk is usually dependent on what they can afford losing. Since trust must 
be understood as being relative, most people are not willing to take the risk of cooperating 
with strangers (showing trust) if the consequence of failed cooperation are decisive. A failed 
cooperation that would cause starvation in e.g. Niger might cause a slight nuisance in e.g. 
Norway. Hence, trust as a norm or a ‘moral’ is much more fragile when people can not 
afford to be betrayed.  
Thirdly, some degree of naivety is beneficial for society. People who continue to trust even 
after a betrayal are to be preferred over cynical people who takes any form of minor betrayal 
as a reason to distrust all and everybody. When Social Capital is reduced to the 
trustworthiness of people, the beneficial effect of naivety is not taken into account.  
Fourthly, Trustworthiness and trust are not exchangeable concepts.  E.g., in a survey 
reported in Halpern (2005) there where almost no relationship between actual burglary rates 
and the perceived likelihood of being a victim of burglary, e.g. did the Portuguese, Belgian 
and French respondents find it much more likely that they would be victims of burglary 
within a year, despite that these countries were below average on actual rates of burglary. 
(Halpern 2005:131) These are the same countries that have among the lowest levels of trust 
in Western Europe. Hence, trustworthiness is not an optimal indicator of trust.  
  The origin of trust is a much debated theme. While some scholars understands the ability 
to trust as primarily a result of the trustworthiness of the rest of society (rational choice 
theory), other scholars understands trust to be a personal quality, either as a result of 
socialization in early childhood (Uslaner 2001:11) or as more or less given by ones religion, 
social class, ethnicity or cultural background (Newton 1999, Putnam 1993, Newton 2004:4). 
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These conflicting theories of trust are backed by both theories that make sense and 
convincing empirical findings.  
Therefore, if analyzed as a two-dimensional concept, then both theories might be true. 
According to Eric M Uslaner you trust people you know, strangers and institutions for 
different reasons. Uslaner differentiates between strategic and moralistic trust.  
 
‘This is trust in people whom we don’t know and who are likely to be different from 
ourselves.  Moralistic trust assumes that we don’t risk so much when we put faith in 
people we don’t know because people of different backgrounds still share the same 
underlying values.  We can’t base trust in strangers on their trustworthiness, because 
there is no way for us to know whether they are honorable.  Moralistic trust provides 
the rationale for getting involved with other people and working toward compro-
mises.’ (Uslaner 1999:5)  
 
Strategic trust on the other hand is trust in people similar to one self.  
 
‘Strategic trust’ applies to people you know and are likely to meet again.  
Trust in people we know (what I call “strategic trust’) helps us decide which 
stockbroker we use or which electrician we hire.  It separates the people to whom we 
would lend $50 (those we believe will repay us) from the folks we would decline 
(either because we suspect they would not pay us back or because we simply don’t 
have any idea whether they would do so).  And it may help us decide whom to admit 
to our bowling league and whom to exclude  (Uslaner 1999:5)  
 
Beyond this dimension, Uslaner argues, is the radius of trust; ‘Particularized trust’ is trust in 
people you know while ‘Generalized trust’ is trust in strangers. Since we lack knowledge of 
strangers the foundation of ‘Generalized trust’ lies in moralistic trust. ‘Particularized trust’ 
on the other hand is based on knowledge and reciprocity and is hence based on a rational 
‘strategic’ evaluation. Trust in institutions is, according to Uslaner, based upon experience 
rather than moral. Hence trust in institutions is a form of strategic trust.  
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‘Trust in institutions, I argue, is similar to strategic trust: It is based upon how well 
government perform–overall, on the economy, in war and peace, and in maintaining law 
and order in a society.  It is based upon experience, as is strategic trust.’  (Uslaner 2001:3)  
 
Contrary to Rothestein, Uslaner claims that trust in institutions is not the foundation of 
moralistic trust. Though, Uslaner differentiates between governmental policy and 
governmental structure, claiming that governments can nourish trust thru the welfare state.  
 Other scholars, e.g.  Russell Hardin (2002) disagrees and claim that trust per se is a rational 
evaluation of trustworthiness, denouncing any form of moralistic or ‘Generalized trust’.  
 
There are reason to assume that the reality is somewhere in between these theories. There is 
of course a notion of the trustworthiness of strangers. There are strangers in Kingston and 
there are strangers in a Japanese rural town. Reputation counts, though a person brought up 
to trust is probably more prone to trust strangers than a person brought up to distrust. 
However both behave more cautious and are less likely to trust strangers in a setting 
infamous for its untrustworthiness. According to Rothstein trust is neither totally moralistic 
nor totally rational, instead he argues for a ‘dualistic’ approach to understand the incentives 
of trust;  
 
‘They want to “do the right thing’, that is, abstain from opportunistic behavior, but 
they do not want to be the “only ones’ who are virtuous, because there is usually no 
point in being the only one who is virtuous. As a result of the information that others 
will only act according to their “myopic’ self interest, they are likely to do the same 
(i.e., “autistic’ action). But if the agents have information that “the others’ have a 
normative orientation (or some other reason) that makes it likely that they will 
cooperate for the common good, the norm based utility function will usually kick in’ 
(Levi 1991)’ (Rothstein, 2000:8)  
 
2.3 The communitarian school of Social Capital research.    
In ‘Making Democracy Work’ (1993) Putnam concludes that the qualitative differences in 
the Italian democracy’s northern and southern part is explained by an unequal distribution 
of Social Capital which in its part is explained by different degrees of participation in  
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networks and organizations. The reason for the relatively weak civil society in the southern 
Italy can, according to Putnam, be traced back to historical circumstance, such as feudalism.  
 In Bowling Alone (2000) Putnam’s focus is not on regional differences but on the alarming 
trend of Social Capital being in decline in the United States. In Bowling Alone Putnam 
explains that American Social Capital is declining because Americans nowadays are 
bowling alone (not with friends) and spend most of their time watching TV. America’s 
alienation is hence a result of declining rates of organizational activity and declining time 
spent with family and friends. According to Putnam the observed decline in Social Capital 
is also explained by a generational effect. While previous generations of Americans were 
bonded together by wars and poverty younger generations does not seem to need one 
another or the local community as much as earlier generations did. However, Putnam 
foresees that ‘a palpable national crisis, like a war or depression or natural disaster’ would 
‘restore civic engagement’ in America (continued in chap.4.5). In ‘Making democracy 
Work’ Putnam defines Social Capital as; “social networks, trust, norms and sanctions 
which eases cooperation in or among groups’.  After critics pointing out that not all forms 
of group cohesion necessarily is beneficial for the whole society Putnam refines his theory 
in Bowling Alone (2000). Acknowledging that there might be negative externalities of 
strong in-group cohesion Putnam now differentiates between  ‘bridging Social Capital’; ‘a 
sociological WD-40’ that reduces friction of societal cooperation among, and in, 
heterogeneous groups -  and ‘bonding Social Capital’ ’a sociological superglue’ uniting 
homogenous groups. (2000:23). While agents of bridging Social Capital, such as e.g. the 
Red Cross promotes cooperation among a broad spectra of society and does not have any 
negative externalities Putnam is more ambivalent concerning the societal benefits of  
‘bonding Social Capital’ since it does not only create ‘strong in-group loyalty’ but may also 
create ‘strong out-group antagonism’(200:23).  
Putnam exemplifies this ‘dark side of Social Capital’ with the Sicilian mafia. A group with 
strong internal cohesion that makes it suited for collective actions within the group but often 
on the expense of non-members. This internal cohesion or ‘bonding Social Capital’ based 
on personal relations, direct reciprocity and internal dependence does however only create 
exclusive trust and is beneficial for neither Palermo nor Italy.  
This negative effect not withstanding, Putnam does not dismiss ‘bonding Social Capital’ as 
a definitely undesirable form of Social Capital but a form of Social Capital that can be 
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misused (2000:315f). From his civil communitarian perspective he claims that; ‘both 
bonding and bridging Social Capital have powerful positive social effects’. According to 
Putnam it is, in most cases, not possible to separate between including ‘bridging’ and 
excluding ‘bonding’ Social Capital because networks and organizations usually contribute 
to both types of Social Capital. Putnam exemplifies with the Afro-American church which 
‘bond’ within race but bridges between classes in society (2000:22). 
 
‘Reciprocity’ is central in Putnam’s understanding of Social Capital. In Bowling Alone 
Putnam differentiates between specific reciprocity which presupposes repeated personal 
contact i.e. I help you since I expect that you will help me in the future, and Generalized 
reciprocity as in hoping anyone to reciprocate (2000:134f). Even though Putnam describes 
the societal importance of Generalized reciprocity among strangers, Putnam’s focus on the 
local community indicates that his theory is primarily based on repeated personal contact 
(2000 s.21f). Putnam’s original understanding of reciprocity in Making Democracy Work 
does also indicate this community oriented, face to face understanding of reciprocity, see 
note4. 
 
2.4 The macro level centered school of Social Capital research.   
Macro level centered scholars defines Social Capital as trust among strangers; ‘social trust’ 
or ‘Generalized trust’. While Putnam et.al. focuses primarily on the local community level, 
macro level centered scholars such as Bo Rothstein emphasize the macro level, societal 
effects of ‘Generalized trust’ rather than community based ‘particularized’ trust. Macro 
level centered scholars do also have a different understanding of the link between civil 
society and Social Capital. While the ‘society centered’ school explains Social Capital to be 
caused by a vivid civil society, the ‘macro level centered’ school regards civil society 
merely as a symptom of abundant Social Capital. Hence Rothstein criticize Putnam’s 
definition of Social Capital ‘social networks, trust, norms and sanctions which eases 
cooperation in or among groups.  Rothstein asks whether a useful definition can include a 
norm (trust) and cooperative behavior (organizational activity), the very behavior that the 
theory is supposed to explain. While Putnam claims that  there is a spill over effect  from 
                                                 
4 In Making Democracy work reciprocity is given a different meaning. ‘Specific reciprocity’ which refers to ‘simultaneous exchange 
of items of equivalent value, as office-mates exchange holiday gifts’... and ‘Generalized  reciprocity’ ‘...which refers to a continuing 
relationship of exchange’.. ‘.that involves mutual expectations that a benefit granted now should be repaid in the future’. (1993:172) 
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group to society level macro level centered scholars e.g. Bo Rothstein argue that for 
organizational activity to have an positive effect, creating bridging not bonding Social 
Capital, it must organize members from broad spectra of society. Meeting people not similar 
to you will probable increase your trust of others while meeting people similar to you might 
have the opposite effect. Rothstein then stressing that many organizations i.e. ethnic 
religious or nationalistic, has the distinction from the ‘others’ as a driving force and that 
these organizations create intolerance and exclusivity rather than bridging trust. (Kumlin & 
Rothstein 2003 s.9, Rothstein 2003a s.166f, 2003 s.16f)   
  
While dismissing the mainstream organizational thesis Rothstein emphasizes the role of 
governments in creating Social Capital. According to Rothstein et al it is primarily just and 
fair institutions that create Social Capital (‘Generalized trust’) such as the welfare state and 
the judicial system etc5. When state institutions work impartially and just, they reduce the 
incentives for corruption and non cooperative behavior among people (Rothstein 2003b:14). 
Rothstein has lately also been stressing the causal link between equality (income equality 
and equality of opportunity) and ‘Generalized trust’. In All for All: Equality and Social 
Trust (2005) is Rothstein and Eric M Uslaner revealing strong correlations between income 
distribution (in countries) and ‘Generalized trust’. Contrary to the communitarian school of 
Social Capital, Rothstein argues that governments can improve levels of ‘Generalized trust’ 
by getting more active in society not less. This by reducing income inequality and reducing 
inequality of opportunity in e.g. the labor market and the public education system.  
 
 
2.5. The relation between ‘Generalized’ and ‘‘Particularized trust’’ 
In Bowling Alone (2000) Putnam concludes that levels of Social Capital are declining in the 
United States. He also foresees that ‘a palpable national crisis, like a war or depression or 
natural disaster’ would ‘restore civic engagement’ in America. The events of 9/11-2001 in 
New York and Washington resulted undeniably in a national crisis. After 9/11 Putnam 
conducted a follow-up survey (first survey in fall 2000) to test the sociological effects of the 
post 9/11 national crisis. Asking the same people the same questions before and after 9/11 
                                                 
5The destructive effect of a malfunctioned judicial system has on Social Capital is exemplified by referring to the opening scene in 
Francis Ford Coppola’s epic drama ‘The Godfather’, a scene where Mr. Bonasera, after being let down by the American judicial 
system, comes to seek help from the mafia boss, Don Corleone. (2003:184ff) 
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Putnam concludes that American levels of Social Capital were rising after the national 
trauma; people trusted each other more, had greater faith in the government and were more 
engaged in community affairs (2002). 
 
Undeniably, a national crisis like 9/11, does have a unifying effect among (some of) its 
inhabitants, but did not Americans in general also unite against someone or something? This 
brings us to a crucial, but nevertheless ignored question in Social Capital studies; Social 
Capital for whom? Whom is the Social Capital supposed to benefit? Which group of 
people?  What is the scope of cooperation? Do e.g. Arab immigrants agree on the claim that 
intra personal trust and levels of Social Capital has been rising since 9/11 2001? Group 
cohesion might have made Americans more trusting towards each others, but to what 
expense? And is it really accurate to claim that the events following 9/11; ‘preemptive wars’ 
and religious/ ethnic tensions have eased “cooperation among groups’ as Putnam defines 
the outcome of Social Capital (authors underlining) (1993, s.167). Another national crises 
created by the hurricane Katrina in September 2005 does also shed light on the bridging and 
bonding forms of Social Capital. The hurricane, which destroyed great parts of New 
Orleans, did not seem to unite people rather it exposed considerable inequalities in 
American society. When there was no ‘outsider’ to unite against, there were far fewer signs 
of unification among Americans.  
 
2.5.1 Social Capital for whom?   
The personal advantages of being an active community oriented citizen, as described by 
Bordieu and Coleman6, can hardly bee questioned, but what about the advantages for the 
rest of society? Do people, without personal relations, cooperate better and trust each other 
more if they are ‘joiners’; active community oriented citizens? Putnam claims there is a spin 
off from trust based on personal relations to trust towards unknown others: 
 
‘People who have active and trusting connections to others – whether family 
members, friends, or fellow bowlers – develop or maintain character traits that are 
                                                 
6 Due to the limitations of this thesis I choose not to give an account for the works of the French sociologist Pierre Bordieu. In his 
version Social Capital is foremost a personal good, related to the individual’s position in society, a personal asset derived from 
his/hers habitus, (similar to ’human capital’) rather than a societal good. Nor James Coleman who’s primary concern was the 
personal advantages of Social Capital. 
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good for the rest of society. Joiners become more tolerant, less cynical, and more 
empathetic to the misfortunes of others. When people lack connections to others, they 
are unable to test the veracity of their own views.... Without such an opportunity 
people are more likely to be swayed by their worst impulses.’ (2000 s.288f) 
 
Despite the strong macro level correlation (e.g. comparing Italian regions) between 
organizational activity and ‘Generalized trust’, that e.g. Putnam presents in Democracy 
Works, this link has yet to be affirmed at an individual level. On the contrary this spin off 
effect has been contradicted in a number of studies.7 Organizational activity (or group 
cohesion) does not seem to render trust among unknown others. To affirm a possible spin 
off effect active organization members would be more trusting than checkbook members. 
However a Norwegian study on organizational membership did not affirm any difference 
between passive and active members. The authors concluded that it was more of a self 
selection process, that already trusting people joined organization while distrusters were not 
willing to unite with strangers. (Rothstein 2003b s.16f; Wollbæk & Sælle2003) Another 
comparative study (Sweden, USA, and Germany) recognized an increase in trust, but not 
towards strangers but towards other members of the group (Rothstein,2003b:16f). As Bo 
Rothstein argues, for organizational activity to have a positive effect, creating bridging not 
bonding Social Capital, it must organize members from broad spectra of society. While 
organizations with a heterogeneous mix of members might have a positive effect on 
bridging Social Capital, homogenous organization might instead be detrimental to bridging 
Social Capital. Rothstein then stressing that many organizations i.e. ethnic, religious or 
nationalistic, has the distinction from ‘the others’ as a driving force and that these 
organizations create intolerance and a feelings of exclusivity rather than bridging trust 
(Kumlin & Rothstein 2003 s.9, Rothstein 2003a s.166f, 2003 s.16f). Another question is 
how seemingly harmless organizations, not based on ethnicity or religion affects Social 
Capital. Does for instance, as Putnam claims, ‘Free Mason lodges’ contribute to bridging 
Social Capital; trust among non-members and ‘unknown others’? 8 ‘Whether members of the 
Free Masons trust each other is rather unimportant in a societal perspective.  At the 
                                                 
7 Clairborn & Martin 2000; Wollebæk & Selle 2002; Whiteley 1999; Uslaner 2002; Stolle 2000; Newton 2002  
8 Putnam is not specifically discussing the ‘Free Masons’ but it’s on the list of organizations showing a decline in 
membership. Arguably are the Free masons a group with informal power beyond democratic control and with limited 
access for the average citizens. 
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aggregated level, comparing nations or regions as Putnam does in Italy, the correlation 
between organizational activity and ‘Generalized trust’ is strong, but apparently non existent 
at the individual level. The disparity between correlations at the individual and macro level 
indicates that the link suggested by Putnam is spurious. The relationship on the aggregated, 
nation/ region level does not tell us much about the causal relationship at the individual 
level.9 Acknowledging in Bowling Alone that ‘Social Capital might work in two ways, 
Putnam also acknowledge a possible trade-off between ‘bridging’ and ‘bonding’ Social 
Capital. According to Putnam was ‘the busing project’, the American civil rights 
movements attempt to improve school integration during the 1960s, detrimental to bonding 
Social Capital.  
 
‘, school integration has posed much more sharply the trade-offs between bridging 
and bonding Social Capital. The busing controversy illustrates this dilemma quite 
clearly, for both sides in the controversy were fundamentally concerned about Social 
Capital (though, understandably, no one used that language). Proponents of busing 
believed that only through racially integrated schools could America ever generate 
sufficient Social Capital – familiarity, tolerance, solidarity, trust habits of 
cooperation and mutual respect – across the racial divide. Opponents of busing 
replied that in most parts of America, neighborhood schools provided a unique site 
for building Social Capital – friendship, habits of cooperation, solidarity. The 
deepest tragedy of the busing controversy is that both sides were probably 
right…Some kinds of bonding Social Capital may discourage the formation of 
bridging Social Capital and vice versa.’ (2000:362) 
 
While the quote above indicates that Putnam recognizes a possible trade-off between 
bonding and bridging Social Capital he does not let this insight influence the rest of his 
analyses. As mentioned, Putnam finds it problematic to separate between bridging and 
bonding Social Capital because networks and organizations usually contribute to both types 
of Social Capital. As I interpret Putnam’s theory, the general rule is a ‘spin off effect’ from 
community based trust (bonding Social Capital) to ‘Generalized trust’ or bridging Social 
                                                 
9 As Rothstein points out in his critic of Putnam’s theory; ‘Statistical associations at the aggregated, or macro, level 
can only be used as an indicator for where on the micro level a further search might be productive. For a causal 
connection to be considered extant, one must prove that it also holds at the micro level’ (2004)  
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Capital (the more you trust members the more you trust strangers see p.6). However this 
general rule does sometimes (when or why is not explicit) become invalid and instead of a 
spin off we end up with a trade off effect. However Putnam does not mention that these two 
functions of Social Capital (bonding and bridging) rarely work at the same time with the 
same group in focus. On the contrary there are numerous accounts of the opposite; high 
levels of trust within a group often profit from the exclusion and distrust of outsiders. Or, in 
other words; ‘cooperation in groups’ often flourishes at the expense of cooperation ‘among 
groups’. This understanding of trust as a sum zero game, a widely accepted view in 
sociology, (Fukuyama 1999:2, Gambetta 1993) is however incompatible with Putnam’s 
theory of Social Capital. Uslaner exemplifies bonding Social Capital with religious 
fundamentalists; 
 
‘Religious fundamentalists who see nonbelievers as heathens are a particularly good 
example.  They will get involved in their communities, but only in their own 
communities... So Particularized trusters do take part in civic life, but not in the 
bridging associations that Putnam correctly sees as essential to helping society 
resolve pressing issues.  ‘‘Particularized trust’’ is likely to exacerbate conflicts 
among different groups since it is based on the core assumption that most people 
don’t share similar values.‘ (Uslaner 1999:7f) 
  
Putnam et al does not seem to realize that there is no de facto ‘dark side of Social Capital’ 
without defining the group or the society who is supposed to benefit from the Social Capital. 
Putnam exemplifies the ‘dark side of Social Capital’ with the Italian mafia, though the 
mafia type of bonding relations might be considered beneficial in another setting, e.g. within 
a family or a country. Whether the Social Capital is bonding (inclusive) or bridging 
(exclusionary) is to a large extent in the eyes of the beholder, or in other words, it depends 
on who is defining the group or who constitutes the group. Is it a local community, an ethnic 
group, a nation or globally. 
 
What is e.g. nationalism but internally ‘bridging’ and externally ‘bonding’ Social Capital? 
That is, bonding in relations to other nationalities. Though, nationalism is also ‘bridging’ 
within a nation since it unites total strangers.   Apparently this does not only apply to 
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extreme cases such as in former Yugoslavia but also to more ‘sound’ types of nationalism 
such as in Norway. According to Norwegian time-series-survey Norwegian nationalism 
(‘patriotism’ Am. Eng.)  increased after the success of the 1994 Lillehammer Olympics. 
However the increase of nationalism coincided (?) with an increase of attitudes of 
ethnocentrism and xenophobia.10  
 
A community level example of the ambiguity of Social Capital is found in gated 
communities. Do e.g. the inhabitants of the American gated community have a lot of Social 
Capital? The level of trust between fellow neighbors is most likely very high. It’s also very 
likely that they do not trust the outsiders, the ones they have fenced out. Fences and guards 
have probably made the inhabitants feeling more secure and hence more willing to trust 
each other. But what about the long term effect for the rest of society? Does fencing in 
neighborhoods increase the trust between neighborhoods? These examples do not indicate 
‘the dark side of Social Capital’ (Putnam) but rather the relative aspects of Social Capital.  
 
The reason for Putnam’s reluctance to discuss the incompatibility of bonding and bridging 
Social Capital is that in his theory, the macro level of Social Capital is reduced to being a 
result of the micro – community- level. Since Putnam et.al. understands local community to 
be the birthplace of Social Capital he also locates its beneficial societal effects at the 
community level. Thus the macro level of Social Capital becomes the end result of adding 
up all communities. However, as mentioned earlier, strong independent communities might 
also work against unity and cooperation. According to Warren (2001) is the Colombian 
province of Medelin one of the richest provinces in terms of community organization and 
Social Capital a la Putnam (in Field 2003:84). Though the internal cohesion also made 
organized crime possible and very few would argue that Social Capital in Medelin is 
beneficial for neither Colombia nor its neighbors. It would be unwise not to recognize that 
in far to many countries, local community unification are not driven by altruistic goals but 
by ethnically  or economically motivated separatism. As exemplified by 9/11, the driving 
force behind community unification often is to unite against someone. The question is 
however under which conditions community – group- cohesion becomes a societal good?  
 
                                                 
10 Kolstad, Arnulf, Lillehammer OL's bidrag til nasjonalisme og etnosentrisme. Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet, 
Trondheim. Psykologisk institutt. Published in: OL-94 og forskningen, ed R. Puijk  
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3. The hypotheses, modernization and trust 
3.1 Introduction  
In this chapter I will ague for how I presume that modernization affects trust. I will hence 
explain the function of modernization relevant to my hypotheses; increased dependence on 
society, decreased dependence on family and kin, material needs satisfaction, secularization, 
and integration of immigrants. In chapter 3.3 I analyze the function of my intermediate 
variables: equality, institutional quality and immigrant integration in advanced industrial 
countries. Modernization is in this thesis defined as the outcome of industrialization and 
post-industrialization. Four aspects of modernization are considered to be most important in 
relation to trust; material needs satisfaction, secularization, the reduced dependence of 
family and kin and the increased reliance on the state. The fall of family and kin and the rise 
of the state as the center of reliance and dependence are in its turn due to several aspects of 
modernization: 
-Urbanization and residential mobility 
-The growth of the service sector and the diversification of the workforce. 
-Female employment 
-Female emancipation  
The effect of modernization on trust 
  
             Structural variables   Social Capital 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Intermediate, political 
       or cultural variables 
  
 
 
 
-Material needs satisfaction  
-Secularization  
-Reduced dependence on 
family and kin and increased 
reliance on the state thru; 
-Urbanization 
-Diversification of 
workforce’  
-Defamilization 
 
     -’Generalized  trust’      
 
     -’Particularized trust’  
-Equality  
-Fairness of government 
institutions and absence of 
corruption  
-Quality and quantity of          
welfare programs    
-Immigrant integration 
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My choices of variables are not a random selection of indicators of modernization but 
chosen on the assumption that they have a causal effect on trust. While other variables of 
modernization might correlate with trust, the relationship is only considered causal if and 
when it can be theoretically explained. It might be argued that this definition of 
modernization is ‘ethnocentric’ since it is the ‘path’ of western countries. However this is 
not an attempt of a ‘Modernization Theory’. While the definition refers to the observed 
outcome of industrialization and post industrialization it does not suggest the likelihood of 
pre industrial or semi industrial countries to follow any (possible)  ‘path’ of western 
countries in all aspects, e.g. democratization.   
 
 The distinction between structural and intermediate variables of modernization is an 
attempt to separate between variables that are considered an integral part of modernization 
and variables that to a large extent are dependent on cultural or political factors. Though, the 
structural and the cultural / political aspects of modernization do to some degree interact. 
E.g. is female employment both an outcome of structural demands of modernization 
(industrialization) but is at the same time spurred / hampered by political decisions as e.g. 
the welfare state. Despite the methodological concerns a model separating between 
structural and intermediate variables is chosen since it increases the possibility to interpret 
and understand variance in trust among countries.   
 
Modernization generally is understood as societal change, measured at macro level, though I 
would argue that it can also be applicable to an individual level. At the individual level 
modernization affects the individual’s choices in terms of education, profession, housing, 
and, indirectly, wage. Modernization does also affect individuals religiosity and values, e.g. 
values regarding family life. These individual ‘choices’ are of course not always free 
choices but determined by socio economic conditions such as class. Though modernization 
affects classes differently since the upper classes has more opportunities to take part of 
‘modernity’.  
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3.2 Structural modernization variables affecting trust 
3.2.1 Material needs satisfaction 
-Hypotheses: ‘Material needs satisfaction renders an increase in ‘Generalized  trust and an 
decreases in ‘Particularized trust’: 
 
Linking trust with material needs satisfaction I lean towards the Post-Modernization thesis 
of Ronald Inglehart. While human primary concern was survival in a traditional society, 
economic surplus has in industrialized and post-industrialized societies made it possible to 
demand more from life. Inglehart labels the resulting value changes as ‘Post- Material’. 
Even though these value changes must be understood as gradually increasing over time, 
Inglehart focuses on value changes since the World War II.   
 
’Throughout most of history, the threat of severe economic deprivation or even 
starvation has been a crucial concern for most people. But the historically 
unprecedented degree of economic security experienced by the postwar generation in 
most industrial societies was leading to a gradual shift from “Materialist’ values 
(emphasizing economic and physical security above all) toward ‘Postmaterialist’ 
priorities (emphasizing self expression and quality of life)’ (1997:4).  
 
With material needs satisfaction comes optimism for the future and a sense of control over 
ones life, a key determinant of ‘Generalized trust’, increasing the opportunity and will to 
trust strangers(Uslaner 2004:12). Since trusting and cooperating with strangers always 
includes some risk, individuals living on the margin do not dare to venture into the risky 
business of trusting strangers. Consequently, unsatisfied material needs are correlated with 
‘Particularized trust’ since only family and kin is to be trusted under scarce conditions. 
According to Uslaner is ‘Particularized trust’ ‘most prevalent among people who: are more 
pessimistic about the future and their ability to determine their own fate ;’(2004:12).  
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3.2.2 Increased reliance on society and decreased dependence on family 
and kin.  
Hypotheses: The reduced dependence of family and kin and the increased reliance on the 
state renders an increase in Generalized  and a decrease in particularized trust. The change 
in dependence/ reliance is by it turn due to: -Defamilization, -Urbanization, -Diversification 
of workforce’  
 
I would argue that modernization is linked with rising levels of ‘Generalized trust’ because 
it has increased the need and reason to interact with strangers. As societies grow larger and 
more complex, the less important gets kinship and the local community. While reliance in 
traditional societies is and was primarily upon family and the local community, a modern 
society demands willingness and an ability to rely on and interact with strangers. 
Modernization splits families, ethnic and religious groups and strengthens the role of the 
state thru several functions.  
-Urbanization and the division of the workforce reduce the possibilities to live and work 
close to ones relatives.  
-Higher education brings people together on the basis of skills and interests rather than on 
the basis of kin and local community affiliation. 
-Wage labor and specialization of the workforce brings people together on the basis of skills 
and interests rather than on the basis of kin. 
-Defamilization. Female wage labor has an additional effect as it reduces women’s 
dependence on a male breadwinner, hence weakening the family and strengthening the state 
as an institution of support.  
 
In addition women are often employed in the service sector that has substituted the family 
as agent of support, e.g. child care, elderly care etc, hence reinforcing the effect of a 
weakening family structure. Wage labor among both men and women is spurred by the 
demands for competitiveness among industrialized countries. Though, since female 
employment is spurred or hampered by cultural, political or institutional factors, e.g. the 
welfare state, it can not only be understood as an ‘integral part’ of modernization.  
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3.2.3 Secularization 
Hypotheses: Religion separates ethnic groups, and believers from nonbelievers, hence, 
secularization contributes to an increase in Generalized  trust and a decrease in 
‘Particularized trust’. 
 
Despite the ‘bridging’ agendas of most religions, religiosity has a ‘bonding’ or cohesive 
effect on most disciples and in most communities. Religion separate believers from non 
believers, ‘bonding’ believers together and excludes infidels. Since inn–group cohesion 
often renders suspicion and distrust of strangers there are commonly negative aspects of 
religious group cohesion. In addition, religious divisions generally follow ethnic divisions, 
spurring ethnocentrism and group cohesion further. This fact has become obvious in 
western multi-ethnic countries where ethnic tension has created a new wave of religiosity 
among Muslim immigrants. It might be argued that some religions are more bonding than 
others e.g. Judaism and Islam. However, the cohesiveness of religions has generally more to 
do with a political situation than the religion it self (keeping in mind that world religions has 
a universal agenda). E.g. is it not unlikely that the protestant Christian communities in 18th 
century France (Huguenots) where more cohesively bonded than Muslim communities in 
the Ottoman Empire at the same time. A notable, albeit anecdotic, example of the ‘bonding’ 
and excluding effects of religiosity comes from Doglas Caulkins research of the 
organizational activity in a provincial fjord community in Norway:  
 
‘An incident from my fieldwork will illustrate the point. Introducing myself 
 to the female leader of one of the Christian organizations, I noted that 
 I was interviewing leaders of all the organizations in the municipality. 
 As I enumerate the types of organizations that I was contacting, she  
looked especially horrified when I mentioned the liberal Youth Association 
 (Frilynt Ungdomslag). ’How can you talk to those people?’ she remarked,  
it wasn’t really a question. Growing even more suspicious of me, she then 
 inquired sharply, ’Are you a personal Christian – have you been saved? 
 If not I don’t think I want to talk with you’  
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For religion to have a excluding effect it must unite someone against someone else, either 
internally in countries or externally between countries Hence there are reason to assume that 
in countries with a homogenous albeit  religious population, we would not find the negative 
exclusionary effect of a bonding religion.  
 
Nonetheless, as a general trend, religiosity is unconducive to modernization. Analyzing the 
World Values Survey 1980 and 1990 Inglehart (1997) found that both the percentage 
attending churches regularly and the percentage saying that ‘God is important in their lives’ 
has diminished significantly during the 10 years between the surveys in almost all advanced 
industrial societies. Inglehart attributes the decline of religious values to 'a rising sense of 
security ‘which makes the need for the reassurance provided by traditional absolute belief 
systems less pressing.’ (1997:281)  
While identifying a resurgence of religious fundamentalism, Inglehart locates this 
contradictory  trend to less developed countries experiencing upheavals and growing 
insecurity (1997:284). While neither atheism nor religiosity creates trust or exclusion as 
such, the likelihood of being a ‘Generalized  truster’ increases if compatriots or foreigners 
are not judged by their religion or their religiosity.  
 
3.3 Intermediate, political or cultural, variables affecting trust 
It could be argued that equality; welfare programs, immigration and fair institutions are a 
direct result of modernization then invalidating them as intermediate variables. However, 
with the basic definitions of modernization used in this thesis, the intermediate variables 
should not be understood as an integral part of modernization. While modernization 
increases the likelihood of welfare programs, institutional fairness, immigration and 
equality11, modernization is not a prerequisite for these conditions. Traditional societies 
might be highly equal and with fair institutions. E.g. The United States is undeniably a more 
unequal society than Norway (Gini-index of GDP/Cap.) but USA can hardly be categorized 
as less modern. Equally, Italian public institutions are considered more corrupt and less fair 
than e.g. German public institutions (Freedom House index), but Italy is not less modern I 
terms of wealth, size of agricultural sector etc. The quality and quantity of welfare programs 
                                                 
11 Modernization affects equality thru rising levels of education, democratization. In addition is the incentives to keep the lower 
classes poor, reduced when the economy no longer is a sum zero game (the lower classes does not get rich on the expense of the 
upper classes). 
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does also differ considerably among equally modernized countries. Instead, equality and the 
fairness of institutions, immigrant integration and welfare programs are highly dependent on 
cultural and/ or institutional and/ or political factors. Though, the causal relationship 
between these variables is difficult to establish, is it e.g. a culture of trust that has affected 
politics in an egalitarian direction or the other way around, policy decisions that have 
shaped a culture of trust? It is also difficult to analyze the explanatory value of these 
variables since culture, political decisions and institution building are interrelated and 
mutually reinforcing.  
 
3.3.1. Equality of income and equality of opportunity 
Hypothesis: Increased equality of income and equality of opportunity generates 
‘Generalized trust’ and weakens ‘Particularized trust’.  
 
Equality, which according to Rothstein & Uslaner (2005:4) is highly correlated with 
‘Generalized trust’, is beneficial to ‘Generalized trust’ because it renders optimism for the 
future (ibid). Optimism for the future is understood as one key determinant of social trust. 
While prosperity as such is important in fulfilling human material needs, there are reasons 
to consider that also the distribution of wealth matters, hence assuming that the relation 
between prosperity and optimism is relative. According to Rothstein and Uslaner 
‘Generalized trust’ is causally related to equality for two main reasons.  
 
‘Optimism for the future makes less sense when there is more economic inequality. 
People at the bottom of the income distribution will be less sanguine that they to 
share in society’s bounty. How well the country is doing collectively, rather than how 
well any of us is doing individually, leads to changes in ‘Generalized trust’ (cf. 
Kinder and Kiewiet 1979). ’Second the distribution of resources plays a key role in 
establishing the belief that people share a common destiny and have similar 
fundamental values. When resources are distributed more equally, people are more 
likely to perceive a common stake with others. In highly unequal societies, people are 
likely to stick with their own kind. Perception of injustice will reinforce negative 
stereotypes of other groups, making social trust and accommodation more difficult 
(Boix and Posner 1998:693)’ (Rothstein & Uslaner 2005:4).  
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Inequality /equality have also an affect on trust via its effect on crime. Inequality feeds 
crime for several reasons. In strict hierarchic societies, with limited social mobility, crime 
might be the only feasible way to leave the state of poverty. Crime might also bee seen as 
righteous by individuals feeling they have been exploited. Since ‘Robin Hoods’ perceive 
they behave righteously, they do not feel morally obliged by any law.  
Another behaviorist explanation by Gillian (1996) is that violent crime often is triggered by 
‘minor incidents of ‘disrespect’ or insults to self-esteem or dignity. An individual whose 
self-esteem and dignity have already been eroded by low social status is particularly 
vulnerable to such insults. Inequality therefore has its impact by exaggerating social status 
differentials and undermining the relative dignity and self-esteem of the have nots.’’ (in 
Halpern 2005:132f). According to Halpern is crime, or the perception of it, strongly 
correlated with trust (Halpern 2005:chap.5) However I find it somewhat tautological to 
explain abundance or lack of Social Capital by crime since crime in many respects is a 
symptom of the lack of Social Capital.  
 
3.3.2. The quality and quantity of welfare programs 
Hypothesis: An extensive and universal welfare state is conducive to ‘Generalized trust’ 
and detrimental to ‘Particularized trust’. 
 
The type and size of the welfare state is related to trust for several reasons. 
Firstly, the welfare state; reduces the importance of family and kin, taking on tasks that used 
to be done by family or the local community, spurring migration and female employment. 
Female employment and female emancipation empowers women and reduces women’s 
dependence on a male breadwinner, hence weakening the family and strengthening the state 
as an institution of support. In addition women are often employed in the service sector that 
has substituted the family as agent of support, e.g. child care, elderly care etc, hence 
reinforcing the effect of a weakening family structure.  
 
Secondly, the welfare state reduces inequality. Though to what extent the welfare state 
reduces inequality and substitute family is due to the quality (type of welfare state) and 
quantity of welfare programs. The size and quality of the welfare state is in its turn 
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conditional to political, institutional and possibly cultural factors. At one end is ‘the night 
watchman state’ which only supports the most fundamental rights of law and order, at the 
other end is the Scandinavian welfare state which supports, or depending on ones ideology, 
intervenes ‘from cradle to grave’. According to Bo Rothstein it is not only the size of the 
welfare state that matters, but also the quality. Rothstein claims that simple redistribution of 
income, as in the liberal welfare state, is not the most efficient way to reduce inequality and 
improve levels of trust in society. While one would assume that simply taking from the rich 
and giving to the poor would be the most efficient way to increase equality, Rothstein 
argues that this is not the case. According to Rothstein is the universal welfare advantageous 
in reducing inequality, for several reasons; 
 
- While taxes are proportional or progressive, services or benefits are nominal, i.e., you get a 
certain sum or a certain type of service. People do not get more out of the system because 
they earn more. This means a considerable redistribution from the rich to the poor. 
 
- While citizens in a universal program are claiming his/ hers rights to benefits, citizens in a 
selective program, with means-tested benefits, might be chosen to ‘deserve’ a benefit. Then 
demarcating the poor ‘receivers’ from the ‘contributors’ of society, stigmatizing the poor. 
This in contrast to the universal system where everyone is using the same welfare programs. 
 
- Means-tested programs presuppose some degree of discretionary decision-making when a 
‘street level bureaucrat’ decides who is eligible for benefits and who is not. The 
bureaucrat’s position to interpret laws and regulations creates suspicions that ‘procedural 
justice’ has not been followed and that the help seeker has been treated unfair. Hence, 
means tested systems can be, or perceived to be, discriminating, creating disbelief and 
distrust.  
 
-A universal welfare state is not only less stigmatizing but also much more approved by the 
middle class ‘contributors’ since they also reap the benefits of  the universal systems such as 
public schools, free healthcare etc. If the middle class is only contributing and not using the 
welfare system it is likely that the recovers of benefits are seen as ‘free riders’. In short a 
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universal welfare state is reducing the feeling of ‘we and them’ in society. (Rothstein 2005, 
7ff, 2003c:233, Kumlin&Rothstein, 2003:12f) 
 
Thirdly: Universal school/ daycare programs etc. do not segregate social classes or ethnic 
groups’ as much as private alternatives (Rothstein 2005:26). Though, whether the 
middle/upper classes actually use these public programs is dependent of the quality of these 
institutions. In many countries e.g. USA, Argentina etc. public funded schools are in 
practice only for the poor. In spite of a growing segregation based on housing, the (former) 
more or less mandatory public school systems in Scandinavia is probably an important 
reason for high levels of Social Capital in these countries. As some scholars emphasize that 
meeting people similar to you in an organizational setting does not create bridging trust, the 
same must go for schools. Only meeting sons of lords and nobles at a British boarding 
school does probably not contribute to trust of ordinary Britons. Also, only meeting member 
of your own ethnic group, in e.g. a religious school, is probably equally devastating for 
‘Generalized trust’.  
 
Though, not all scholars agree that the welfare state contributes to Social Capital. In the 
market liberal development theory, where Social Capital is synonymous with a vibrating 
civil society that opposes a suffocating state, an extensive welfare state is considered 
detrimental to Social Capital. According to this argument, the welfare state “crowds out’ 
informal networks and NGO:s that used to take responsibility for citizens.  By ‘crowding 
out’ civil society the welfare state reduces the mutual reliance and dependence between 
family and community members. Consequently, a universal welfare state, as the 
Scandinavian, where, they claim,  solidarity is reduced to paying tax, weakens the bond and 
network between people (Fukuyama 2000b:6, Rothstein 2003c:223). According to the 
sociologist Alan Wolfe, the Scandinavian welfare state; ‘squeezes families, communities, 
and social networks.’ (Rothstein 2003d s.3). The liberal critique of extensive welfare 
programs is based on a communitarian understanding of Social Capital where 
‘Particularized’ rather than ‘Generalized’ trust is the basis of Social Capital. There are 
reasons to assume that parts of the critique is correct, extensive welfare states can, in some 
aspects, ‘crowd out’ family and kin as the basis of reliance and dependence, but whether 
that is desirable or not is primarily a question of ideology. Crowding out family and kin can 
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arguably fuel alienation, but on the other hand also reduce negative aspects of 
‘Particularized trust’ such as  'amoral familialism' of mafia like groups. 
 
3.3.3. Just and fair government institutions 
Hypothesis: Fair and trustworthy government institutions and the absence of corruption 
nourishes ‘Generalized trust’ and weakens ‘Particularized trust’.  
 
According to Rothstein there are several indicators of the importance of the state in the 
formation of Social Capital, e.g. stable democracy, a low degree of corruption and economic 
equality12 (Rothstein 2003a s.173). The strongest indicator is however people’s evaluation of 
justice security. Rothstein refers to a Swedish investigation13 where confidence in 
democratic institutions and the justice system, like the police and courts, was strongly 
positively correlated to high levels of ‘Generalized trust’. Based on these empirical findings 
Rothstein concludes that ‘Generalized trust’ is supported in countries with ‘procedural 
justice’ and the rule of law. If people trust that ‘free riding’ and law offenders get caught, it 
increases the propensity to trust strangers. Institutional quality is positively correlated to 
‘Generalized trust’ insofar as it has the capacity to monitor and punish free-riding and the 
capacity to generate trustworthiness by its own trustworthiness. Bo Rothstein explains why 
Institutions of law and order are crucial in sustaining and creating trust;   
 
‘In a civilized society, institutions of law and order have one particularly important 
task: to detect and punish people who are “traitors’, that is, those who break 
contracts, steal, murder and do other such non-cooperative things and therefore 
should not be trusted. Thus, if you think (i.e., if your cognitive map is) that these 
particular institutions do what they are supposed to do in a fair and effective manner, 
then you also have reason to believe that the chance people have of getting away 
with such treacherous behaviour is small. If so, you will believe that people will have 
very good reason to refrain from acting in a treacherous manner, and you will 
therefore believe that “most people can be trusted.’’ (2000:492) 
 
                                                 
12 Democracy (Inglehart 1999), corruption (della Porta 2000), equality (Uslaner 2002) i Rothstein (2003a) 
13 SOM-institutet (Samhälle Opinion Massmedia) Göteborg   
 
 33
A just legal system will reduce transaction costs, making trust less risky.  The more 
experience people have with compliance, the more likely they are to have confidence in 
others’. 
Institutional quality might however be dubious as an explanation for trust or the lack of 
trust, the causal direction is difficult to determine. Is corruption and institutional 
ineffectiveness a sign of weak ‘Generalized trust’ or does corruption and ineffective 
institutions create distrust? I leave this question open to my analysis. 
3.3.4. Integration of immigrants.  
Hypothesis: A successful integration of immigrants is conducive to ‘Generalized trust’ and 
is detrimental to ‘Particularized trust’.  
Immigration or migration affecting levels of societal trust is by no means a new 
phenomenon. A century ago someone from the neighbor village could be deeply mistrusted 
because of a slightly different accent. Today many people distrust strangers from other 
countries and continents. The effect of immigration on trust is to a large extent conditional 
to the success or failure of integration of immigrants. Integration has in this sense two 
functions, first it affects immigrant perception of being discriminated, and secondly it 
affects how the majority population perceives immigrants. In short, a successful integration 
of immigrants reduces the notion of ‘us vs. them’ in society. As residential mobility is 
understood to be detrimental to Social Capital so is also heterogeneity by and large assumed 
to create distrust (Halpern, 2005:262). Again we have to separate between Generalized and 
‘Particularized trust’ and we have to define the group affected.  While diversity is a 
prerequisite for ‘Generalized trust’, as it creates the opportunity for it, diversity can also 
lead to tension between groups and as such increase ‘‘Particularized trust’’ on the expense 
of the ‘Generalized trust’. According to Uslaner diversity breed tolerance in cities with low 
levels of residential segregation (Uslaner soc.handbook:18f). Geographical isolation, on the 
other hand, may breed in-group identity at the expense of the larger society, hence 
increasing the level of ‘‘Particularized trust’’ and most likely decreasing the level of 
‘Generalized trust’. Though, since residential segregation is more of a rule than an 
exception in many new immigrant countries the net effect of immigration is conditional to 
factors as housing policy, citizenship policy, language and education policy, the labor 
market, historical, cultural or religiously rooted factors, such as the openness of the majority 
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population towards immigrants and the openness of immigrants towards the majority 
population. Employment is considered to be the most important aspect of integration. While 
having a job only is one aspect of integration it is an indicator of many other aspects of 
integration e.g. language proficiency, discrimination by the majority population, cultural 
differences etc. Employment among immigrants is however not only an effect of integration 
it has also a strong and independent effect on integration. Employment among immigrants 
creates spaces for interaction enabling diversity and mutual understanding, it increases 
language skills, it creates a sense of participation in a ‘common project’ among immigrants, 
it lessens the perception among the ethnic majority that immigrants are ‘free riders’, it 
diminishes social misery and hence levels of crime among immigrants, making them more 
trustworthy in the eyes of the ethnic majority population.  It can however be argued that 
employment among immigrants not only is related to integration as such but also related to 
labor market policies, e.g. minimum wages and job security. Though, no matter the reason 
for immigrant unemployment, employment as such creates integration while unemployment 
creates prejudice, discrimination and social misery, hence employment is the most crucial 
aspect of integration and also a preeminent measurement of integration. However, not only 
the ethnic majority discriminates, petty entrepreneurs’ belonging to an ethnic minority tends 
to prefer to employ people from their own ethnic group, e.g. the Chinese minority in SE 
Asia. Hence, some of the beneficial aspects of employment are lost in these ethnic 
homogenous workplaces. While I do not have the possibility to control for ethnically 
homogenous workplaces, the number of employees in these ‘ethnic workplaces’ is assumed 
to be relatively small in a ‘western’ setting.  
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4. Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
To test my hypotheses I have chosen a two folded approach: 
-An individual level approach, analyzing a possible link between trust and modernization at 
an individual level. 
-A macro level approach, analyzing a possible link between trust and modernization at a 
macro/ country level.   
 
The reason for a two folded approach is that I presume that the process of modernization is 
applicable to both a societal and an individual level. In other words, the process of 
modernization affects both individuals and society. People live in modern/ traditional 
societies and within these societies some people live more modern lives while others lives 
more traditional lives. At the individual level modernization affects the individual’s choices 
in terms of education, profession, housing, and, indirectly, wage. Modernization does also 
affect the individual’s religiosity and values (see Inglehart 1997). While it might be 
considered controversial to rank the modernity of professions , I  presuppose that some 
professions are more modern and diverse since they to a higher extent brings people 
together on the basis of skills and interests rather than on the basis of kin and local 
community. 
 
 In this thesis I will hence investigate both the effect of individual modernity and the effect 
of ‘societal modernity’. Some variables of modernity in this thesis are applicable to both 
macro and individual level, e.g. I find it likely that both the individual’s personal wealth and 
the wealth of the society around the individual have an effect on the individuals trust. The 
intermediate variables are only applicable to a macro level, e.g. equality makes sense, only 
in relation to others.  For this reason different variables will be used in the macro and the 
individual level analyses. Hence, there is no ‘model’ that catches the whole hypothesis that 
can be tested in one statistical analysis. However, adding up findings from a logistic 
regression on individuals, a linear regression and correlations (scatter plot’s) on country 
variation I will be able to draw some conclusions on the relation between modernity/ 
intermediate variables and trust.  
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The question of causality might be to complex to be sufficiently dealt with in this thesis. 
E.g. is ‘Generalized trust’ a result of equality, or were already existing high values of trust a 
prerequisite for creating an equal society. In this thesis I do not expect to answer the 
question of line of causality but to investigate how valid a modernization hypothesis is in 
relation to the alternative explanations of the origins of ‘Generalized trust’/ Social Capital 
such as; organizational activity theory, institutionalism theory, culturalism theory. 
 
4.2 Data  
At the individual level I have analyzed the 1981, 1990 and 2000 wave of the World Values 
Survey14. In order to operationalize ‘Particularized trust’ I was tied to the 1990 survey. Since 
the country means of ‘Generalized trust’ are relatively constant during the 10 year span 
between the surveys I do not find the use of two different surveys problematic. In the 1981 
WVS I only analyzed the country means of ‘Generalized trust’.   
 
Since my hypotheses concern changes of trust levels over time it would naturally be 
preferable to have time series data on levels of trust and modernization variables. Though, 
the 20-year span between the first World Value Survey (1980) and the last survey of 
1999/2000, is far too short to explain any effects of modernization. In the absence of useful 
times series data I have to compare countries at different stages of modernization, 
postulating that my variables of modernization indicate stages in the modernization process. 
Such extrapolation of data can of course be questioned  and modernization is by no means a 
linear process nor path dependent, though the general process of modernization has proven 
to change peoples values in predictable directions, see e.g. Inglehart’s ‘Modernization and 
Postmodernization’ (1997).  
 
In the macro level analysis I analyze the variation in trust and modernization among 
countries, using aggregated individual level data from the World Values Survey (WVS), 
International labor organization, OECD, expert evaluations and official country statistics on 
modernization, the welfare state, equality, corruption, secularization and unemployment. 
Some of the aggregated data is collected from State of Nations, -The World Database of 
                                                 
14 The WVS is a cross-country project coordinated by the Institute for Social Research of the University of Michigan, under the 
direction of Ronald Inglehart. Each wave carries out representative national surveys of the basic values and beliefs 
of individuals in a large cross-section of countries.  
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Happiness15 and was not acquired by myself. However, the validity of the data from this 
database has been checked obtaining the original source.  
 
4.2.1 Operationalization of ‘Generalized trust’ 
‘Generalized trust’ is in this thesis operationalized by the World Value survey’s questions 
on trust; ‘Generally speaking, do you say that most people can be trusted, or that you need 
to be very careful in dealing with people?’ -Yes, most people can be trusted or –No, you 
have to be careful dealing with people.  Though there are reasons to scrutinize this standard 
operationalization of ‘Generalized trust’? The first doubt is what the WVS questions 
actually measures? A rational evaluation of the trustworthiness of people in the society the 
respondents live in, expressed as; -My experience is that most people are honest/ dishonest! 
or rather a statement about their character? -I am a trusting and positive person!/ I am not a 
naive person!. Nevertheless, both connotations grasps Social Capital. The survey questions 
are also dubious since it is up to the respondent to define who these ‘most people’ are. Is it 
people who the respondent regularly meet, have met, or is it total strangers? Is it people 
from his/ hers; hometown, citizens of the same province/ country/ or ethnic group? 
According to a study on Social Capital in Eastern Europe, the Roma people of Bulgaria 
where one of the most trusting groups in East European countries, in fact more trusting than 
the majority Bulgarian population. At least a high proportion of them said that ‘most people 
can be trusted’ (Dowley&Silver 2002:518). This is surprising since discriminated minorities 
usually does not trust the majority population. The surprisingly high trust of the Roma 
people might indicate that the question could be ‘misinterpreted’ in the sense that it does not 
always reveal ‘Generalized trust’ as  trusting strangers. However, it can also be explained by 
context specific circumstances. In this direction point results from a factor analyses, 
conducted by Eric M. Uslaner, of the 1996 Metropolitan Philadelphia survey. The factor 
analyses of the survey, that includes more than a dozen questions about whom (or what) 
people trusted, indicated that the standard WVS question on trust actually measures trust 
towards strangers and does not ask people to look back at their experiences. Uslaner found 
three clear dimensions, one for strangers (people you meet on the street, people who work 
where you shop), another for friends and family (people at your place of worship, at your 
                                                 
15 Veenhoven, R., World Database of Happiness, Erasmus University Rotterdam.  Available at: 
http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl  Assessed at: (13.06.07). Apart from its original sociological focus this database contains data 
on a multitude of social science topics.  
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club, at your job, your boss, and your family), and a third for government (schools and city, 
state, and federal governments).  The standard question on trust loaded strong on the 
stranger factor (Uslaner 2000:10).  I find Uslaners findings convincing in a western setting. 
However since I doubt the universality of his findings, results from third world countries 
should be interpreted cautiously.    
 
4.2.2 Operationalization of ‘Particularized trust’  
Since the World Values Survey does not include any single questions aimed at detecting 
‘Particularized trust’, I have combined three WVS questions to single out ‘Particularized 
trusters’.   
-‘Can most people be trusted?’  
-‘How much do you trust Norwegians? (respondents countrymen, trust on a five degree 
scale in WVS, ‘not at all’ to ‘completely’ ) 
-‘How much do you trust your family?’ (trust on a five degree scale in the WVS). 
 
Particularized trust is here operationalized as respondents trusting their family and 
countrymen ‘completely’ but at the same time, do not trust ‘most people’.  
 
Analyzed separately does neither complete trust of ones family nor complete trust of one 
countrymen indicate ‘Particularized trust’, though combined with distrust of strangers (not 
to trust most people?) does these variables indicate ‘Particularized trust’.  
 
While 74.9 % of the German respondent in WVS 1990 say that they trusted ‘Germans’ 
completely  or a little, while only 6% said they trusted Germans ‘not very much’ or ‘not at 
all’ 16.  This, in stark contrast to the WVS question, ‘can most people be trusted’, were only 
33.1% of German respondents said that ‘most people can be trusted’ and 62% meant that 
you ‘have to be very careful’. I interpret this stark discrepancy as respondents understand 
e.g. ‘Germans’ as an identification of ethnicity. Germans seems to trust ‘Germans’ 
understood as ethnic Germans but not ‘most people’ whom might be anyone, including 
foreigners or immigrants.  
                                                 
16 WVS question G001: Germany: Trust completely 22,1%, trust a little 52.8,  Neither trust or distrust15.1%, Not trust very much 
5.5%, Not trust at all 0.5%. 
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It can be argued that these respondents rather express xenophobic values, though I would 
say that xenophobia is a sign of ‘Particularized trust’. A person whom is expressing trust 
towards ethnic countrymen but not towards immigrants is here understood as the opposite of 
‘a Generalized truster’.  
The validity of the operationalization of ‘Particularized trust’ is partly verified by a 
correlation indicating a negative link between ‘Generalized’ and ‘Particularized trust’ at the 
individual level in WVS 1990 (chapter 7.1)   
 
4.2.3 Operationalizations of modernization 
 
-Material needs satisfaction 
Country level: 
-Daily per capita supply of calories 1997. (UN-HDR / ‘State of Nations’17) 
- Energy consumption per pp 2000. (International Energy Agency)  
-Life expectancy 2000 (UN-HDR/ ‘State of Nations’)  
- Purchasing power per capita 2000. (UN-HDR 2002/ ‘State of Nations’) 
-Television receivers per 1000 pp 1995. (UN-HDR 1998 table 34/ ‘State of nations’ 
   
Individual level: WVS 2000  
V234. During the past year, did your family: Save money/ Just get by/ Spent some savings/  
Spent savings and borrowed money.  
V236 Household income 1-10 scale recoded to 1-5 scale (country specific) 
 
-Specialization of the workforce / education and urbanization 
Country level: 
- Percentage of population living in urban areas. (UN-HDR / State of nations)  
- Percentage of the labor force employed in the service sector. (International Labor  
Organization, ILO) 
- Percentage of the labor force employed in the agriculture sector. (ILO) 
- Average years of schooling 2000. (UN-HDR / State of nations)  
 
Individual level: WVS  
                                                 
17 State Of Nations: Veenhoven, R., World Database of Happiness, Erasmus University Rotterdam. All references to ‘State of 
Nations’ is available at: http://www1.eur.nl/fsw/happiness/statnat/statnat_fp.htm 
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V230. In which profession/occupation do you or did you work?  
V226. What is the highest educational level that you have attained?  
V229. Are you employed now? (employed, student, housewife, retired, never employed)  
V241. Size of home town:  
 
-‘Increased reliance on society and decreased dependence on family and kin’.  
Country level: 
-Female employment; percentage of women in employment (OECD)  
-Gender equality index; % women in parliament, woman's professional participation ,  
women’s share of income. (UN-HDR/ State of nations) 
-Divorces per capita (UN-DY/ State of Nations). 
-Defamilization  index , is constructed using a combination of factors belived to influence  
defamilization , -female labour participation rate relative to male, -maternity leave 
compensation (percentage of normal pay), -duration of compensated maternity leave 
(weeks), -average female wage as percentage of male average wage. (Bambra 2004) 
 
Individual level, WVS: 
V228. Do you live with your parents? 
V107  Do you have children, if yes how many? 
V115: ‘A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her                          
           children mother who does not work’. (Agree/ disagree) 
V 116: ‘Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay’ (Agree/ disagree) 
V78: ‘When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women’. (Agree/  
           disagree) 
V110: ‘A woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled’. (Agree/ disagree) 
 
 
-Secularization 
Country level: 
-Percentage of respondents in WVS getting ‘comfort and strength from religion’, country  
average. (WVS 2000/ State of Nations) 
-Percentage of respondents in WVS identifying as a religious person country average.  
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(WVS 1995/ State of Nations) 
-Percentage of respondents in WVS attending religious services once a week or more,  
country average. (WVS 1995/ State of Nations) 
-Percentage Muslim population (Kurian. 1992/ State of Nations) 
-Percentage Protestant population (Kurian 1992/ State of Nations) 
 
Individual level, WVS 
V197. Do you find that you get comfort and strength from religion?  
V185. Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend 
religious services these days?  
V186. Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are:A religious 
person/ Not a religious person/ A convinced atheist  
V184. Do you belong to a religious denomination? Which one?  
 
-Intermediate political, institutional or cultural variables 
Country level: 
- Social Security benefits in percent of GDP 1996. The ILO definition of social Security  
covers: medical care, child allowances and allowances for illness, unemployment, 
aged, disablement, pregnancy, invalidity, and war victims. It does not include 
education, or culture subsidies (ILO/ State of Nations).   
- The ‘quality’ of welfare state is operationalized using Esping-Andersens variables from  
The three Worlds of Welfare Capaitalism; ‘decomodification index’18, ‘program 
universalism’19 and ‘percentage means-tested poor-relief’20,  
-Gini index of GDP, (UN-HDR/ State of Nations) 
-Share of income or consumption of the richest 20% of the population to the poorest 20% of  
the population (UN-HDR/ State of Nations) 
                                                 
18 Unemployment Insurance; -replacement rate, -qualifying period, -duration of benefit, -waiting days -coverage ratio 
Sickness Cash benefit; -replacement rate, -qualifying period, -duration of benefit, -waiting days -coverage ratio 
Retirement Pensions; -minimum replacement rate, -standard replacement rate, -contribution ratio, -qualifying period, 
-coverage/take-up rate. For details see Esping-Andersen 1990 
 
19 Degree of program universalism as averaged percentage of population, 16-64, eligible for sickness unemployment, 
and pension benefits, and degree of equality in the benefit structure as an average for the above mentioned three 
programs in terms of the ratio of the basic level of benefits to the legal maximum benefit possible.  Esping-Andersen 
1990 s. 73 
 
20 Means-tested poor-relief as % of total public social expenditure, Esping-Andersen 1990, s. 73 
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-Government corruption; Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index  2002 
 (http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2002) 
-Institutional quality ‘Index of 1) Voice and accountability (democracy), 2) Political 
nstability nd violence, 3) Government effectiveness, 4) Regulatory burden, 5) Rule of 
Law, 6) Graft based on various sources, among which surveys among businessmen.’ 
(IMF / State of Nations)  
-Rule of law 1998. ‘Aggregation of subjective assesments. Includes indicators which  
measure the extent to which respondents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society; perceptions of the incidence of both violent and non-violent crime, the 
effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary and the enforceability of contracts. 
(Kaufmann c.s.1998/ State of Nations) 
-Government effectiveness 1998. Aggregation of subjective assesments. Combines  
perceptions of the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, 
the competence of civil servants, the independence of civil service from political 
pressure and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies into a single 
grouping. The main focus of this index is on inputs required for the government to be 
able to produce and implement good policies and deliver public goods. (Kaufmann 
C.S. 1999, World Bank/ State of Nations) 
-Corruption in Government 1982-1995. ‘Researchers assessment of  Political Risk Services  
(ICRG). The ICRG staff collects political information converting these into risk 
points on the basis of a consistent pattern of evaluation’ (ICRG 1996/ State of 
Nations). 
 
-Control of Corruption 1998- ‘Aggregated indicator, subjective assessments. Measures  
perceptions of corruption, defined as the exercise of public power over private gain; 
ranging from frequency of ‘additional payments to get things done’ to the effect of 
corruption on the business environment, of measuring ‘grand corruption’ in the 
political arena to the tendency of elite forms to engage in ‘state capture’’. (Kaufmann  
C.S. 1999/ State of Nations) 
-Immigrant integration on labor market. Ratio of, percentage unemployment among 
 immigrants and the whole population. (Calculated from data in van Tubergen 2004) 
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Individual level: 
- Aggregation of question C16 in European Social Survey 2000: Would you describe 
yourself as being a of a group member that is discriminated against in this country? 
(Country average) 
-Background variables for individual level analysis 
V223. Sex of respondent 
V225. Age of respondent  
4.3 Validity of the World values Survey, contextual findings?  
In comparative analyses of surveys there is always the question of translation and 
interpretation. Has ‘trust’ the same significance in all languages? Has e.g. the English trust 
the same meaning as the German vertrauen or the French, confiance? The problem of 
translation and interpretation increases the further we go from the original context of the 
survey. In the case of WVS it was originally designed for a western setting by western 
scientists, hence the applicability of survey questions must scrutinized if to be used in 
comparative analyses. An example of the complexity of comparative analyzes of the WVS 
is questions on ‘civic ness’, cheating on taxes. While cheating on taxes justifiably might be 
understood as ‘un civic’ behavior in Norway it might be a sign of awareness in a corrupt 
country where tax payer’s money ends up on a Swiss bank account.  
Due to the complexity of analyzing trust in different contexts I chose to exclude all 
developing countries from most parts of the individual level statistical analysis. Though, to 
give an indication of the effect of ‘material needs satisfaction’ among developing nations a 
logistic regression is presented in chapter 5.2.1. Excluding countries does of course reduce 
the universality of the hypothesis. However including all countries would blur results valid 
in one setting but not in another. E.g. is education negatively correlated to trust in many 
developing countries, but positively among developed countries. The effect of education 
would hence level out in an individual level analysis if all countries were included in the 
regression. The interpretation of ‘most people’ and their trustworthiness is also to some 
extent contextual (see chapter 4.4.)  For people living in a third world rural setting, ‘most 
people’ has probably a totally different meaning than to an urban  Japanese. While this 
 44
reasoning eventually disqualifies all research based on interpretations of cross country 
surveys (in the end you do not even know if your wife interprets trust the way you do) I set 
the limit where results can be interpreted with some credibility to a setting of developed 
industrial nations. In the country level analysis, developing countries are however included, 
but results should be interpreted with caution.  
 
Besides the question of interpretation in comparative surveys there is also the question of 
technical validity. Even though the WVS has been monitored by local academics I find 
reason to question the validity of surveys in parts of the ‘developing world’. Foremost if the 
interviewed selection actually represents the population? In countries without national 
registration and without housing addresses it is rather unlikely that a survey institute has 
managed to receive a representative selection. Due to costs of transportation, remote parts of 
country, lacking infrastructure, are likely to be underrepresented. People of means are also 
likely to be overrepresented since they live in cities are literate, and relatively easy to get in 
touch with. Finding a representative selection is probably most problematic in Sub Sahara 
Africa.  
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5. Statistical analysis  
5.1 Outline and introduction 
Beginning In chapter 5.2, analyzing the relation between ‘Generalized’ and Particularized 
trust’ at the individual and the country level, followed in chapter 5.3 by a summary of levels 
and changes in ‘Generalized’ and ‘Particularized trust’ in the World values Surveys 1980, 
1990, and 2000. In the chapter 5.4 I will try to establish whether there exist a link between 
trust and different aspects of modernization at the individual level (‘individual’ or ‘personal 
modernization’). The individual level data is analyzed in several logistic regressions, 
estimating the effect of the modernization and intermediate variables on trust.  
Though being an individual level analysis, respondent’s country of residence is included in 
the individual level regression since ‘country of residence’ is assumed to have an effect on 
individuals trust that the other variables does not grasp or ‘catch’. A strong independent 
effect for ‘country of residence’ will then indicate that factors or variables, not included in 
the regression, plays a role for individuals trust. These variables might be less tangible 
variables, such as culture.  
In chapter 5.5 I will analyze the relation between modernization and trust at a country level. 
To do this I have collected data on country means for several aspects of modernization and 
the intermediate variables, estimating the strength of any possible relationships between 
modernization/ intermediate variables and the two ‘types’ of trust. Correlations between 
modernization variables and trust are presented as scatter plots.  
A linear regression analyses with country means of ‘Generalized trust’ as the dependent 
variable is presented in chapter 5.6 Since it might be difficult to overlook the results from 
the two level analysis, a summary of the individual and country level results relevant to each 
hypothesis is found in chapter 5.7.   
Interpreting survey results from countries with vastly different culture and political climates 
is indeed complex. Variables having one effect in a developing country might have the 
opposite effect in Europe, e.g. among Indian respondents education has a negative effect on 
trust while it is the opposite in Europe. Including respondents from developing countries in 
the analysis would blur, or level out effects that exist among developed nations. Analyzing 
Europe (EU-25, Norway and Switzerland) USA, Australia, New Zeeland, Japan, and South 
Korea the risk of confused results is reduced.  
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5.2 ‘Generalized’ vs. ‘Particularized trust’ 
To begin with I will analyse the relationship between ‘Generalized’ and Particularized  
trust’ 
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The correlation between ‘Generalized’ and ‘Particularized trust’ is -.365 pearsons r at the 
country level, and -,286 pearsons r at the individual level, indicating the ‘trade off’ between 
‘Generalized’ and Particularized  trust’ predicted in the hypotheses. Countries with a high 
percentage ‘Particularized trusters’, has generally also a low percentage ‘Generalized 
‘Generelaized trusters’  is percentage claiming that ‘most people can be trusted’ in 
the WVS 1990. ‘Particularized trusters’ is operationalized as respondents who trust 
his/ hers family ‘completely’ and trust his/ hers countrymen completely (on a five 
degree scale) but does not trust ‘most people’ in WVS 1990. 
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trusters’. Though, as indicated by the scatter plot in figure 1, the variation in ‘Particularized  
trust is greatest among ‘developing countries’.  
 
5.3 Trends end levels of ‘Generalized’ and ‘Particularized trust’. 
Comparing ‘Generalized trust’ among populations in the World Values Survey 1981, 1990 
and 2000 in figure 2, does not instantly strengthen my hypotheses. Of the 21 countries that 
participated in the 1981 and the 2000 survey, 11 of them show a decline in percentage that 
claims that ‘most people can be trusted’.   
A decline of ‘Generalized trust’: 
- Pakistan -30%  -S-Africa -17% -Austria -14% -UK -13% -Hungary -12% -Argentina -11%  
-Canada -9%, - Ireland -6% - N-Ireland -5% - USA -5% - France -3%  
An increase of ‘Generalized trust’: 
- Spain +1% - Finland +1% -Iceland +1%, - Belgium +2% - Japan + 2% -Mexico +4% -
Italy +6% 
-Sweden +10% - Denmark +14% -Netherlands +15%.  
The most dramatic fall in ‘Generalized trust’ is found among ‘developing’ countries, former 
east block countries and Anglo-Saxon countries. Stable or rising levels are found in Japan, 
the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries.  From 1990 to 2000 there seems to have 
been a general decline in trust levels, 26 out of 38 countries. As shown in figure 1 most 
‘high trust’ countries are advanced industrial countries. Among the ‘low trust’ countries we 
exclusively find developing countries. 
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Data on ‘Particularized trust’ is only available from the WVS 1990, hence any possible 
changes over time can not be analyzed. Figure 3. is an overview of the percentage 
‘Particularized trusters’ in 41 countries. 
Figure 3.  
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As seen from this figure there is a vast variation of ‘Particularized trust’, from 0,9% in 
Czechoslovakia to 43% in Turkey. The average of all respondents is 8.3%. In line with the 
hypothesis are the countries with a high percentage of ‘Particularized trusters’ either 
developing countries or East block countries. Apart from the two conflict thorn Irish 
countries and South-Korea none of the last 18 countries, with most ‘Particularized trusters’, 
are advanced industrial countries.  
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5.4 Individual level logistic regression 
Analyzing individual level data I have the opportunity to test if or how individual 
modernization affects trust.  Though there is only limited opportunity to test a ‘whole 
model’ since some variables in my hypotheses are not applicable at an individual level or at 
least not possible to operationalize at an individual level. Using the World Value Survey, I 
do however have the possibility to test: 
- ‘Material needs satisfaction’, operationalized as income. 
- ‘Defamilization ’, operationalized as family situation and patriarchal values. 
- ‘Secularization’, operationalized as church attendance and religiosity.  
- ‘Country of residence’, can other factors, attributed to the respondents country of 
residence, explain the respondents likelihood to trust? 
   
Remaining aspects of the hypothesis; the quality and quantity of the welfare state, 
institutional quality and immigrant integration are societal variables not directly applicable 
to an individual level. These variables can however be analyzed indirectly, e.g. -controlling 
for material needs satisfaction, defamilization  and secularization, are respondents living in 
a certain type of welfare state more likely  to be ‘Generalized trusters’ than others? – are 
respondents living in equal societies more likely to be ‘trusters’ than others? Due to a lack 
of data (to few countries to statistically analyze) the intermediate variables are not analyzed 
with ‘particularized trust’ as the dependent variable.  
 
In order to observe the specific effect of certain variables, and to improve readability and 
overview I will here present several logistic regressions. The first regression estimates the 
effect of background and modernization variables on ‘Generalized trust’, controlled for 
country of residence. In the subsequent regression ‘defamilization variables’ are added, still 
controlling for background modernization and country of residence. In order to observe the 
effect of the variables in certain countries, tables with the effect of country of residence is 
presented. The difference in odds ratio between the ‘controlled result’ and the ‘uncontrolled 
result’ does also indicate the effect of the variables.   
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.5.4.1 Logistic regressions: ‘Generalized trust’ explained by structural aspects of 
modernization?  
 
In the regression presented in table 1 indicates the effect of background and modernization 
variable on ‘Generalized trust’ among individuals.  
Sex and age, are background variables, other variables are linked to modernization and part 
of the hypothesis. 
 The respondent’s country of residence is included in the regression but presented in the 
subsequent table to improve readability and overview. See appendix 1 for a guide to 
interpreting the odds ratio of the logistic regressions.  
 
Table 1. A logistic regression, estimating the effect of background and modernization  
variables on ‘Generalized trust’, controlled for country of residence 21. 
  Sig. Exp.(B) 
Female                                                  Reference group: Male ,013 ,928 
Age 15-29                                            Reference group: 30-49 ,000 ,791 
Age 50-69                                            “ ,000 1,171 
Age 70-110                                          “ ,021 1,165 
Home town < 2000 inhab.                  Reference group: >500,000 inhab. ,033 1,124 
Home town 2,000-10,000 inhab.         “  ,517 ,968 
Home town 10,000-50,000 inhab.       “ ,651 1,021 
Home town 50,000-100,000 inhab.     “ ,155 ,922 
Home town 100,000-500,000 inhab.   “ ,638 1,024 
No formal education                             Reference group:  
                                                             University education 
,000 ,496 
Incomplete secondary school              “  ,000 ,666 
Incomplete primary school                  “  ,000 ,491 
Primary school                                     “  ,000 ,474 
Secondary school                                 “ ,000 ,789 
Unskilled manual worker                    Reference group: Professional 
                                                             work e.g. lawyer       
,000 ,603 
                                                 
21 List of countries in Table 2. 
 52
Table 1. continued Sig. Exp(B) 
Farmer/ agricultural worker                “ ,008 ,794 
Skilled/ Semi-skilled manual worker  “ ,000 ,685 
Foreman/ Supervisor                           “ ,000 ,655 
Office worker                                      “ ,072 ,916 
Employer < 10 employees                  “ ,001 ,786 
Employer > 10 employees   “ ,082 ,856 
Military/ Security personnel               “  ,152 ,804 
‘Never had a job’                               Reference group: “Employed’ ,111 ,849 
Retired                                                “  ,119 ,925 
Housewife                                           “  ,060 ,857 
Student                                                “ ,375 1,145 
Unemployed                                        “ ,028 ,818 
Income 1/5 (lowest)                             Reference group: 3/5 (average)    ,000 ,828 
Income 2/5                                           “ ,000 ,851 
Income 4/5                                           “ ,005 1,127 
Income 5/5 (highest)                            “ ,000 1,243 
N 26596 
 
 
From this regression we can conclude that age, occupation, and income has a fairly strong 
effect on trust among respondents from the 31 ‘developed’ countries. The effect of 
education is in fact very strong.22. Size of hometown seems to be less important, though 
living in a town (< 2000 inhab.) does slightly increase the odds of being a ‘Generalized 
truster’.  
The odds ratio for respondent to be ‘Generalized truster’, all background and modernization 
variables hold constant is presented in table 2, bellow. Denmark is chosen as the Reference 
group. Odds ratio is hence in relation to Denmark23.   
 
 
                                                 
22 34,2% of the respondents has an educational level bellow ‘secondary school, hence, the odds ratio for education is not due to 
extreme values. 
23 Norway has a slightly more ‘trusters’ than Denmark according to the WVS, though lacking data on respondent’s income.  
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Table 2. A logistic regression, estimating the effect of country of residence on 
‘Generalized trust’, controlled for background and modernization.  
Reference 
country 
 ‘Denmark’ 
Uncontrolled 
Exp.(B) 
Controlled 
Exp.(B) 
 Uncontrolled 
Exp.(B) 
Controlled 
Exp.(B) 
Australia ,364 (sig. ,000) ,291 (sig. ,000) Latvia ,112   (sig. ,000) ,102 (sig. ,000)
Austria ,255 (sig. ,000) ,217 (sig. ,000) Lithuania ,171   (sig. ,000) ,153 (sig. ,000)
Belgium ,233 (sig. ,000) ,174 (sig. ,000) Luxemburg ,185   (sig. ,000) ,147 (sig. ,000)
Bulgaria ,185 (sig. ,000) ,143 (sig. ,000) Malta ,143   (sig. ,000) ,113 (sig. ,000)
Canada ,349 (sig. ,000) ,265 (sig. ,000) Netherlands ,818   (sig. ,028) ,741 (sig. ,015)
Czech Republic ,171 (sig. ,000) ,141 (sig. ,000) Poland ,125   (sig. ,000) ,113 (sig. ,000)
Estonia ,364 (sig. ,000) ,119 (sig. ,000) Romania ,112   (sig. ,000) ,043 (sig. ,000)
Finland ,734 (sig. ,001) ,651 (sig. ,000) Slovakia ,100   (sig. ,000) ,080 (sig. ,000)
France ,153 (sig. ,000) ,134 (sig. ,000) Slovenia ,150   (sig. ,000) ,106 (sig. ,000)
Germany ,276 (sig. ,000) ,234 (sig. ,000) Spain ,295   (sig. ,000) ,260 (sig. ,000)
Greece ,144 (sig. ,000) ,098 (sig. ,000) Sweden ,983   (sig. ,848) ,810 (sig. ,107)
Hungary ,152 (sig. ,000) ,162 (sig. ,000) Switzerland ,341   (sig. ,000) ,250 (sig. ,000)
Iceland ,362 (sig. ,000) ,299 (sig. ,000) USA ,308  (sig. ,000) ,200 (sig. ,000)
Ireland ,296 (sig. ,000) ,267 (sig. ,000) Great Britain ,224  (sig. ,000) ,218 (sig. ,000)
Italy ,260 (sig. ,000) ,230 (sig. ,000) N- Ireland ,345  (sig. ,000) ,288 (sig. ,000)
 
 
Comparing the controlled odds ratio results with the uncontrolled results in table 2 it is 
apparent that only a small part of the variation be explained by the background and 
modernization variables. Country of residence seems to have a strong effect of its own. 
 
-‘Defamilization’: 
 The next step is to include ‘defamilization’ variables in the regression. Background 
variables and country hold constant, does family values, values on defamilization  or family 
situation affect the likelihood of individuals being ‘Generalized trusters’?   
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Table 3. A logistic regression, estimating the effect of defamilization and family 
variables on ‘Generalized trust’, controlled for country of residence, background, and 
modernization.  
 Sig. Exp.(B) 
Lives with parents? (v.228)                      Reference group: No ,982 ,999 
Have no children (v.107)                            Reference group:1-4 children ,108 1,079 
Have five or more children                         “                             ,058 1,188 
-‘A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship 
 with her children as a mother who does not work’ (v115) 
                                                                    Reference group: Totally agree 
  
Agree ,945 1,003 
Disagree ,000 ,827 
Totally disagree ,099 ,852 
‘-Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay’ (v116) 
                                                                    Reference group: Totally disagree 
  
Disagree                                                      “     ,907 1,008 
Agree                                                           “ ,102 1,117 
Totally agree                                               “ ,950 1,005 
When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women 
(v.78) 
                                                                   Reference group: Disagree/ neither  
,000 ,771 
-A woman does not have to have children in order to be fulfilled. 
 (v.110)                                                          Reference group: Needs children  
,281 ,959 
N 26596 
 
As predicted, this analysis indicates a negative relation between patriarchal values, and 
‘Generalized trust’. Respondents claiming that men have more right to jobs then women and 
respondents who do not approve of ‘working mothers’ are less likely to be ‘Generalized 
truster’. However family situation seems to be irrelevant to ‘Generalized  trust’.  -
Religion/religiosity: 
Background, modernization, and country variables hold constant, does religiosity or degree 
of secularization affect the likelihood of being a ‘Generalized truster? While the hypothesis 
links religiosity with ‘Generalized trust’, it does not link the likelihood of trust with any 
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certain religion. The reason to include specific religions is to see the effect of ‘minority 
religions’ or ‘sectarian religions’. Due to the bias of western countries in this regression 
only Catholicism and Protestantism are ‘majority religions’ the other religions in the 
regression has either very few followers or are foremost represented by immigrants (except 
Buddhism in South Korea and Japan). Since no Muslim or Hindu country is included in the 
regression almost all Muslims and Hindu respondents are immigrants. The effect of these 
religions can consequently be attributed to being an immigrant.  
       
Table 4. A logistic regression, estimating the effect of religiosity/ religion on 
‘Generalized trust’, controlled for country of residence, background, modernization 
and ‘defamilization’.  
 Sig.  Exp.(B) 
Gets comfort and strength                   Reference group: yes 
 from religion 
,969 1,002 
Religious person                                  Reference group: Not religious  ,364 1,042 
Atheist ,270 1,131 
Visits ‘Church’                              Reference group: Only special   
                                                             holydays/ once a year 
More than once a week:                                  
,000 1,369 
Once a week                                       “  ,000 1,297 
Once a month                                     “ ,018 1,135 
Less than yearly                                 “ ,496 ,958 
Practically never                               “ ,230 ,942 
Roman catholic                                   Reference group: Not member of any    
       church 
,000 ,738 
Protestant “ ,277 ,915 
Hindu                                                  “   ,945 1,028 
Buddhist                                              “ ,167 1,560 
Baptist                                                 “ ,636 1,241 
Jehovah’s witnesses   “ ,064 ,328 
Mormon “ ,669 1,321 
Muslim                                                 “ ,240 ,781 
All other religions “ ,000 ,689 
N 26596 
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Opposed to the hypothesis, secularization does not seem to have a positive effect on 
‘Generalized trust’ at the individual level. All variables in the regression, except frequency 
of church visits, suggest that religiosity has no or a very limited effect on ‘Generalized 
trust’. The positive effect of frequent church visits might be attributed to organizational 
activity rather than religiosity24. However being member of Jehovah’s witnesses sharply 
reduces the odds of being a ‘Generalized truster’ (significant at a 10% level.)  
Finally an overview is presented where the effect of all variables in the regression can be 
compared with the uncontrolled result. Controlled for; background, modernization, family 
and religiosity variables. 
 
Table 5. A logistic regression, estimating the effect of country of residence on 
‘Generalized trust’, controlled for, background, modernization ‘defamilization’ and 
religiosity/ religion. 
Reference 
country 
‘Denmark’ 
Uncontrolled 
Exp.(B) 
Controlled 
Exp.(B)  
Uncontrolled 
Exp.(B) 
Controlled 
Exp.(B) 
Australia ,364 (sig. ,000) ,339 (sig. ,000) Latvia ,112 (sig. ,000) ,105(sig. ,000) 
Belgium ,233 (sig. ,000) ,213 (sig. ,000) Lithuania ,171 (sig. ,000) ,187 (sig. ,000)
Bulgaria ,185 (sig. ,000) ,216 (sig. ,000) Luxemburg ,185 (sig. ,000) ,225 (sig. ,000)
Canada ,349 (sig. ,000) ,314 (sig. ,000) Malta ,143 (sig. ,000) ,126 (sig. ,000)
Czech republic ,171 (sig. ,000) ,191(sig. ,000) Netherlands ,818 (sig. ,000) ,725 (sig. ,088)
Estonia ,155  (sig. ,000) ,135 (sig. ,000) Poland ,125 (sig. ,000) ,146 (sig. ,000)
Finland ,734  (sig. ,000) ,676 (sig. ,007) Romania ,061 (sig. ,000) ,046 (sig. ,000)
France ,153  (sig. ,000) ,186 (sig. ,000) Slovakia ,100 (sig. ,000) ,092 (sig. ,000)
Germany ,276 (sig. ,000) ,290 (sig. ,000) Slovenia ,150 (sig. ,000) ,150 (sig. ,000)
Greece ,144 (sig. ,000) ,115 (sig. ,000) Spain ,295 (sig. ,000) ,335 (sig. ,000)
Hungary ,152 (sig. ,000) ,172 (sig. ,000) Sweden ,983 (sig. ,848) ,971 (sig. ,846)
Iceland ,362 (sig. ,000) ,312 (sig. ,000) USA ,308 (sig. ,000) ,213 (sig. ,000)
Italy ,260 (sig. ,000) ,307 (sig. ,000) Great Britain ,224 (sig. ,000) ,220 (sig. ,000)
Japan ,368 (sig. ,000) ,319 (sig. ,000)    
 
 
As seen from table 7 the Odds ratio is by large unchanged when controlled for background, 
modernization, family situation/ values and religiosity25. The variation among respondents 
can hence not be attributed to these variables. So far in the analysis, ‘country of residence 
                                                 
24 Though, as mentioned in chapter 2.4 and 2.5 the organizational theory has not been confirmed in other studies.  
 
25 As mentioned above, since there the effect of the model is limited, any possible inter correlation is not investigated. 
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explains almost all the variance among respondents, indicating that other country specific 
aspects affect people’s ability or willingness to trust strangers.  
 5.4.2 Logistic regressions: ‘Generalized trust’ explained by intermediate 
variables? 
Does living in a rich/ poor country, a corrupt country, an equal country or does certain 
welfare states have any effect on ‘Generalized trust’? Background variables, modernization, 
religiosity26 and family situation/ values, are included in the regression. Since these socio-
economic variables vary considerably among developed/ developing countries two 
regressions is presented, first one including  both developed (western) and developing 
countries and the subsequent including only developed countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 Religiosity is included though the variables on specific religions (protestant, Muslim etc.) is left out.  
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Table 6. A Logistic regression, estimating the effect of the welfare state, income 
equality and country income, on ‘Generalized trust’, controlled for, background, 
modernization ‘defamilization’ and religiosity. 
 Sig.  Exp(B) 
Liberal welfare state                              Reference: ’Social democratic’  
                                                               Welfare State 
,000 ,682 
Conservative welfare state ,000 ,393 
Mediterranean welfare state ,000 ,404 
None defined or no welfare state ,000 ,418 
Low income country                              Reference: “High income country’ ,000 ,342 
Lower middle income country ,000 ,446 
Upper middle income country ,000 ,580 
Upper medium equality country             Reference: High equality country ,000 1,492 
Lower medium equality country ,353 ,962 
Low equality country ,000 ,515 
Medium low corruption country              Reference: Low corruption country ,463 1,034 
Medium high corruption country ,000 1,185 
High corruption country ,026 ,904 
 
In line with the hypothesis the social democratic welfare state is conducive to ‘Generalized 
trust’.  Though, with only four ‘social democratic welfare states’ there is a problem of a 
small ‘N’ (to few countries to compare). Wealth has also a fairly strong effect. Opposed to 
the hypothesis, the odds ratio of ‘Generalized trust’ is higher if the respondent lives in an 
“Upper medium equality country’ than a “High equality country’. A probable reason for this 
is the high income equality of former communist countries, countries with very few 
‘Generalized trusters’.  Somewhat surprising are there no link between corruption and 
‘Generalized trust’. Presumably this lack of link between corruption and ‘Generalized trust’ 
can be attributed to corrupt Asian countries with many ‘Generalized trusters’. If this is a 
fact, these ‘outliers’ can be identified in scatterplotts presented in the country level analysis.    
To see the effect without outliers, a regression without developing nations is presented. 
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Table 7. A Logistic regression, estimating the effect of the welfare state, income 
equality and country income, on ‘Generalized trust’, Controlled for, background, 
modernization ‘defamilization’ and religiosity. ‘Developing countries’ excluded. 
 Sig. Exp (B) 
Liberal welfare state                              Reference:’ Social democratic’ 
                                                                                   Welfare State. 
,000 ,450 
Conservative welfare state ,000 ,357 
Mediterranean welfare state ,000 ,589 
None defined welfare states ,000 ,169 
Low income country27                          Reference: “High income country’       - See note 29
Lower middle income country       -          - 
Upper middle income country ,000 3,376 
Upper medium equality country           Reference: ‘High equality country’ ,457 1,050 
Lower medium equality country ,357 ,922 
Low equality country     -            - 
Medium low corruption country            Reference: ‘Low corruption country’ ,000 ,711 
Medium high corruption country ,000 ,487 
High corruption country      -           - 
 
When developing and former communist countries28 are excluded from the regression there 
is a strong link between low corruption and ‘Generalized trust’. Opposed to the hypothesis 
respondents from ‘Upper medium income countries’ are much more likely to be 
‘Generalized trusters’ than respondents from ‘High income countries’. On explanation for 
this is that there is a degree of ‘diminishing returns’ in the relation between ‘need 
satisfaction’ and ‘Generalized trust’. Among respondents from these 31 ‘developed’ 
countries it is indeed likely that at least their basic ‘needs’ are satisfied, hence when an 
individuals ‘material needs’ are satisfied, any further increase in wealth does not increase 
the likelihood of being a ‘Generalized truster’.  
 
                                                 
27 The scales on income, corruption and equality are made on the basis of both ‘developing’ and ‘developed’ countries, since no 
‘developed  countries’ falls in the extreme categories, e.g. ‘low income countries’, there are empty spaces in this table.  
 
28 Though, the new EU countries from Eastern Europe are included in the regression.   
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5.4.3 ‘Logistic regressions: ‘Generalized trust’ among individuals from 
developing countries explained by ‘material needs satisfaction’?                      
As mentioned is there a risk of confused results when developing countries is included in 
the statistical analyses. Though, since it might be anticipated that ‘material needs 
satisfaction’ has a strong effect on trust among individuals with very few material needs 
satisfied, developing countries are included in the logistic regression presented in table 9. 
‘Material needs satisfaction’ is operationalized as whether the respondent, -saved money? – 
just get by – spent savings – spent savings and borrowed money29. The reference country is 
Norway and the reference group of material need satisfaction is ‘saved money’.   
Table 8. . Logistic regression, estimating the effect of ‘material needs satisfaction’ 
on ‘Generalized trust’, controlled for ‘country of residence’. 
Reference  
country: 
‘Norway’ 
 
Odds Ratio of ‘Generalized trust’ 
            Exp.(B) 
 Uncontrolled              Controlled   
             
 
Odds Ratio of ‘Generalized trust’ 
                     Exp.(B)                     
Uncontrolled              Controlled 
 
Albania ,164 (sig. ,000) ,168 (sig. ,000) Singapore ,109 (sig. ,000) ,104 (sig. ,000) 
Algeria ,066 (sig. ,000) ,066 (sig. ,000) Zimbabwe ,072 (sig. ,000) ,076 (sig. ,000) 
Azerbaijan ,131 (sig. ,000) ,133 (sig. ,000) Spain ,287 (sig. ,000) ,254 (sig. ,000) 
Argentina ,096 (sig. ,000) ,100 (sig. ,000) Switzerland ,331 (sig. ,000) ,315 (sig. ,000) 
Australia ,354 (sig. ,000) ,363 (sig. ,000) Turkey ,101 (sig. ,000) ,132 (sig. ,000) 
Bangladesh ,165 (sig. ,000) ,166 (sig. ,000) Uganda ,045 (sig. ,000) ,048 (sig. ,000) 
Armenia ,167 (sig. ,000) ,176 (sig. ,000) Macedonia ,082 (sig. ,000) ,083 (sig. ,000) 
Brazil ,016 (sig. ,000) ,016 (sig. ,000) Egypt ,326 (sig. ,000) ,337 (sig. ,000) 
Canada ,339 (sig. ,000) ,346 (sig. ,000) Tanzania ,045 (sig. ,000) ,044 (sig. ,000) 
Chile ,155 (sig. ,000) ,160 (sig. ,000) USA ,300 (sig. ,000) ,295 (sig. ,000) 
China ,601 (sig. ,000) ,617 (sig. ,000) Uruguay ,150 (sig. ,000) ,155 (sig. ,000) 
Taiwan ,318 (sig. ,000) ,318 (sig. ,000) Venezuela ,102 (sig. ,000) ,105 (sig. ,000) 
Colombia ,065 (sig. ,000) ,067 (sig. ,000) Serbia ,122 (sig. ,000) ,125 (sig. ,000) 
Georgia ,117 (sig. ,000) ,124 (sig. ,000) Montenegro 
India ,346 (sig. ,000) ,351 (sig. ,000) Dominican  Republic ,183 (sig. ,000) ,190 (sig. ,000) 
Indonesia 
 
 
,458 (sig. ,000) ,486 (sig. ,000) Bosnia Herzegovina ,100 (sig. ,000) ,106 (sig. ,000) 
                                                 
29 This operationalization of ‘material needs satisfaction’ is inadequate comparing ‘developed countries’. ‘Saving’/ 
‘spending’  money’ might reflects the respondent’s apprehension of economic security and not ‘need satisfaction’ e.g. 
economic security provided by a generous welfare state renders less need to act thrifty and save rather than spend 
money. Though, comparing developing countries this operationalization is assumed to be adequate.    
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Table 8. 
Cont. 
Reference  
country: 
‘Norway’ 
 
Odds Ratio of ‘Generalized trust’ 
            Exp.(B) 
 Uncontrolled              Controlled   
             
 
Odds Ratio of ‘Generalized trust’ 
                     Exp.(B)                     
Uncontrolled              Controlled 
 
Iran ,535 (sig. ,000) ,544 (sig. ,000) El Salvador ,089 (sig. ,000) ,094 (sig. ,000) 
Japan ,357 (sig. ,000) ,363 (sig. ,000) South –Korea ,205 (sig. ,000) ,208 (sig. ,000) 
Jordan ,202 (sig. ,000) ,212 (sig. ,000) Viet Nam ,346 (sig. ,000) ,357 (sig. ,000) 
Mexico ,143 (sig. ,000) ,147 (sig. ,000) South Africa ,071 (sig. ,000) ,068 (sig. ,000) 
Morocco ,161 (sig. ,000) ,164 (sig. ,000) Moldova ,090 (sig. ,000) ,094 (sig. ,000) 
Nigeria ,184 (sig. ,000) ,183 (sig. ,000) Puerto Rico ,157 (sig. ,000) ,166 (sig. ,000) 
Sweden ,955 (sig. ,611) ,939 (sig. ,488) New Zeeland ,510 (sig. ,000) ,523 (sig. ,000) 
Pakistan ,213 (sig. ,000) ,226 (sig. ,000) Just get by  ,850 (sig. ,000) 
Peru ,064 (sig. ,000) ,064 (sig. ,000) Spent savings  ,818 (sig. ,000) 
Philippines ,049 (sig. ,000) ,051 (sig. ,000) 
Spent savings, 
borrowed 
money 
 ,797 (sig. ,000) 
 
  
As indicated by table 8, respondents from all countries are less trusting than Norwegians. 
Brazilians and Tanzanians are the least trusting.  When controlled for ‘material needs 
satisfaction’ the odds ratio remains largely the same. Almost none of the variation of 
‘Generalized trust’ can be attributed to the ‘material needs satisfaction’ variable. As 
operationalized in this regression, ‘material needs satisfaction’ does not explain the 
differences in ‘Generalized trust’ among respondents from developing and developed 
nations.  
 
 
 
 
5.5 Logistic regression: ‘Particularized trust’ explained by structural and 
intermediate variables of modernization?      
 
Using individual level data I will test material needs satisfaction, defamilization  and 
secularization. Since the country level variation of ‘Particularized trust’ is strongly affected 
by outliers and since the variation is limited among advanced industrial countries I chose 
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not to include the country level variables of the welfare state, institutional quality and GDP 
in this logistic regression.   
 
 
Table 9. Logistic regression, estimating the effect of background, modernization  
family and religiosity on ‘Particularized trust’, controlled for country of residence. 
 Sig. Exp.(B) 
Female                                                  Reference group: Male ,000 ,788 
Age 15-29                                            Reference group: 30-49 ,000 ,743 
Age 50-69                                            “ ,000 1,318 
Age 70-110                                          “ ,000 1,449 
Completed school at 13 years of age   Reference: Completed >20 years  ,000 1,538 
Completed school at 15 years of age ,000 1,543 
Completed school at 17 years of age ,000 1,412 
Completed school at 19 years of age ,006 1,235 
Unskilled manual worker                    Reference group: Professional work        
                                                                       e.g. lawyer        ,008 1,336 
Farmer/ agricultural worker                “ ,057 1,261 
Skilled/ Semi-skilled manual worker  “ ,016 1,253 
Foreman/ Supervisor                           “ ,098 1,273 
Office worker                                      “ ,329 ,913 
Employer < 10 employees                  “ ,645 1,060 
Employer more than> 10 employees  “ ,576 1,106 
Military/ Security personnel               “  ,018 1,714 
“Never had a job’                               “ ,183 1,150 
Income 1/5 (lowest)                             Reference group: 3/5 (average)     ,085 1,127 
Income 2/5                                           “ ,591 1,034 
Income 4/5                                           “ ,219 ,906 
Income 5/5 (highest)                            “ ,018 ,766 
Lives with parents? (v.357)                  Reference group: yes ,944 ,995 
Have no children (v.107)                      Reference group:1-4 children ,677 ,972 
Have five or more children                   “                             ,434 1,066 
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Table 9. continued  Sig. Exp(B) 
A woman does not have to have           Reference group: Needs children 
children in order to be fulfilled  ,008 ,862 
Having a job is the best way for           Reference group: Disagree 
a woman to be independent  (v.222)  ,006 ,872 
Gets comfort and strength                    Reference group: yes 
 from religion! ,600 ,961 
Religious person                                   Reference group: Not religious  ,866 1,013 
Atheist                                                  “ ,213 ,833 
God very important in life                    Reference group: neither       
(.v176)                                            important nor unimportant ,009 1,211 
Visits ‘Church’                                  Reference group: Only special holydays/ 
More than once a week                                               once a year
,334 1,070 
Once a month                                     “ ,108 1,138 
Less than yearly                                 “ ,909 ,992 
Roman catholic                                  Reference group: Protestant 
,332 1,105 
’Fundamentalist Protestant ,993 ,999 
Jew ,721 ,769 
Muslim ,008 1,746 
Hindu ,012 1,663 
Buddhist ,397 ,585 
All other religions ,127 1,256 
Not member of  any church ,713 ,957 
N 26596 
 
From this regression we can conclude that women are less likely to be ‘Particularized 
trusters’.   Rising age increase the odds of being a ‘Particularized truster’. In line with the 
hypothesis does rising length of education decrease the odds of being a ‘Particularized 
truster’. ‘Professional workers’ are the least likely and military personnel the most likely to 
be ‘Particularized trusters’. Income seems to be less important, though the earners of the 
highest incomes are less likely to be ‘Particularized trusters’. Family situation does not have 
any significant effect though patriarchal values are linked to ‘Particularized trust’. 
Respondents claiming that god is very important in their life are more likely to be 
‘Particularized trusters’, none of the other variables on religiosity are significant. Muslims 
and Hindus are more likely to be ‘Particularized trusters’ though, as mentioned, the 
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variation can be attributed to immigranthood. Finally an overview is presented where the 
effect of all variables in the regression can be compared with the uncontrolled result. 
Controlled for background, modernization, family and religiosity variables in 29 of the 42 
countries. 
 
Table 10. Logistic regression, estimating the effect of country of residence on 
‘Particularized trust’, controlled for background and modernization variables. 
Reference  
group: 
‘Denmark
’ 
 
Odds Ratio of ‘Particularized trust’’ 
            Exp.(B) 
 Uncontrolled              Controlled     
          
Odds Ratio of ‘Particularized 
trust’’      
            Exp.(B) 
 Uncontrolled              Controlled   
Argentina 2,556 (sig. ,000) 1,616 (sig. ,084) Japan ,273   (sig. ,000)  
Austria 1,806 (sig. ,000) 1,550 (sig. ,097) Lithuania 3,313 (sig. ,000)  
Belarus 1,925 (sig. ,000)  Mexico 2,663 (sig. ,000) 1,623(sig.,062)
Belgium ,825   (sig. ,234) ,735   (sig. ,243) Netherlands ,448   (sig. ,001) ,495 (sig.,030) 
Bulgaria 4,666 (sig. ,000) 3,836 (sig. ,000) Nigeria ,634   (sig. ,034) ,440 (sig.,008) 
Brazil 2,095 (sig. ,000) 1,044 (sig. ,868) Norway ,650   (sig. ,032) ,464 (sig.,017) 
Canada 1,543 (sig. ,007) 1,252 (sig. ,364) Latvia 5,314 (sig. ,000) 5,961(sig.,000)
Chile 1,987 (sig. ,000) 1,496 (sig. ,108) Lithuania 3,313 (sig. ,000)  
China ,458   (sig. ,001)  Poland ,965   (sig. ,855)  
Czecho 
slovakia ,154   (sig. ,000)  Portugal 2,742 (sig. ,000) 1,516 (sig,105)
Estonia 2,315 (sig. ,000)  Romania 2,468 (sig. ,000) 1,411(sig.,201) 
Finland ,526    (sig. ,019) ,519  (sig.,111) Russia ,832   (sig. ,285) ,863  (sig.,607)
France ,725    (sig. ,120) ,542  (sig.,047) Slovenia 6,693 (sig. ,000) 5,117 (sig,000)
WGermany 1,152  (sig. ,382) ,787  (sig.,345) S-Africa ,679   (sig. ,020)  
E-Germany 1,842  (sig. ,000) 1,416 (sig.,165) S-Korea 3,105 (sig. ,000)  
Hungary 1,793  (sig. ,001) 1,317 (sig.,308) Spain 1,366 (sig. ,033) ,902 (sig.,678) 
Iceland ,604    (sig. ,038)  Sweden ,617   (sig. ,024) ,809 (sig., 653)
India 7,915  (sig. ,000) 4,115  (sig.,000) Turkey 12,291(sig. ,000)  
Ireland 2,128  (sig. ,000) 1,456  (sig.,150) USA 1,126  (sig. ,471) ,762 (sig.,289) 
N-Ireland 2.627  (sig. ,000) 1,408  (sig.288) Great Britain 1,191  (sig. ,303) ,915 (sig.,728) 
Italy ,190    (sig. ,000) ,077    (sig. ,000)    
(Empty spaces in the table due to missing data) 
 
Controlling for modernization variables does over all reduce the importance of country of 
residence. The strongest effect is found among respondents from countries with a high 
percentage of ‘Particularized trusters’ where the odds is markedly reduced controlling for 
personal modernization. While these results to some degree fits to the hypothesis. The 
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hypothesis can not explain why e.g. Czechoslovakia or Italy has many fewer ‘Particularized 
trusters’ than e.g. Slovenia and Spain.  
 
5.6. Country level statistical analysis  
5.6.1. Modernization index  
In this analysis, which focuses on countries rather than individuals, my intension is to 
explain some of the unexplained effect of ‘country of residence’ from the individual level 
analysis. Hence in this regression I compare countries at different stages of modernization, 
postulating that my variables of modernization indicate stages in the modernization process. 
For this reason I have constructed an index of modernization including standardized Z-
scores of; percentage of workforce employed in service sector, purchasing power per capita, 
energy consumption per capita and calorie consumption per capita. Other aspects of 
modernization such as female emancipation, is considered to be intermediate variables and 
will hence be analyzed separately. The correlation between the modernization index and 
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Generalized trust’ among 63 countries is moderate at 0,434 Perarsons r (sig. 1% level). 
 
 
 
As indicated by the scatter plott in fig. 4 some outliers are weakening the correlation. Asian 
countries like Iran, China and India seem to have trusting populations despite scoring low 
on the modernization index. While Chinas high percentage of ‘trusters’ often is attributed to 
Confucianism (Inglehart 1999) and cooperation demanding farming methods  and Indias 
position to its democratic legacy, I have not found any attempts to explain the high 
proportion of trusters in the totalitarian and Islamic state of Iran. According to Inglehart’s 
cross country analyses of trust (1999) is totalitarianism and Islam negatively correlated to 
‘Generalized trust’. At the other end of the scatterplott we find USA, Belgium and France, 
countries which according to the hypotheses should have a more trusting population.  
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Figure 4. ‘Generalized ’ trust and modernization in 63 countries 
Percentage claiming that ‘most people can be trusted’ in World Values Survey 2000.  Modernization index:  
Standardized Z-scores of; percentage of workforce employed in service sector, purchasing power /c., energy 
consumption/ c., calorie consumption/ c. Figures for 2000. Sources and country codes in appendix 2. 
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In line with my hypotheses, there is a negative correlation between the modernization-index 
and ‘Particularized trust’ (-,47 pearsons r sig 1% level). As indicated by figure 5. the 
percentage of ‘Particularized trusters’ vary considerably. From 43% in Turkey to 0,9% in 
the Check republic. Nigeria and China has an unpredicted low fraction of ‘Particularized 
trusters’ while Turkey’s percentage of ‘Particularized trusters’ is unexpectedly high. 
However, as mentioned in the methodological chapter, there are reasons to analyze third 
world country survey results cautiously.   
 
 
 
Figure 5. ‘Particularized trust’ and modernization in 34 countries 1990
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‘Particularized trusters’are respondents who trust his/ hers family and his/ hers countrymen ‘completely’ 
but does not trust ‘most people’ in World Values Survey 1990. Modernization index:  Standardized Z-
scores of; percentage of workforce employed in service sector, purchasing power /c., energy 
consumption/ c., calorie consumption/ c. Figures for 1990. Sources and country codes in appendix 2.  
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5.6.2 Material needs satisfaction 
As indicated by table 11 does all ‘material needs satisfaction’ variables correlate positively 
to ‘Generalized trust’. There is also a relation between ‘Particularized trust’ and ‘material 
needs satisfaction’ though calorie consumption and life expectancy are not significantly 
correlated to ‘Particularized trust’.  
 
Table 11. Correlations between trust and ‘Material need satisfaction’ 
 ‘Generalized  
trust’ in 
 WVS 2000 
‘Particularized 
trust’ in  
WVS 1990 
Daily per capita supply of calories (1997) Pearson Correlation ,316(**) -,185 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,008 ,266 
  N 69 38 
Energy consumption per pp. (2000) Pearson Correlation ,422(**) -,426(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,008 
  N 75 38 
Purchasing power per capita (2000) 
 
Pearson Correlation ,428(**) -,440(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,006 
  N 71 38 
Television receivers per 1000 pp (1995) Pearson Correlation ,470(**) -,371(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,022 
  N 64 38 
Life expectancy at birth 
(2000) 
Pearson Correlation ,357(**) -,199 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,002 ,231 
  N 72 38 
 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
5.6.3 Specialization of the workforce and urbanization. 
Here the results are more disparate, urbanization and percentage agricultural workers are not 
significantly correlated to ‘Generalized  trust’. Again, the East Asian countries; India, 
Indonesia and China is more trusting than their level of urbanization or their specialization 
of their workforces would incline.  Though, in line with the hypothesis is ‘Particularized 
trust’ negatively correlated with both urbanization and specialization of the workforce. 
Somewhat surprising is that percentage of women in professional/ technical jobs seems to 
be irrelevant. 
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Table 12. Correlations between trust and Specialization of the workforce/ 
urbanization. 
  
  
‘Generalized trust’ 
 in WVS 2000 
‘Particularized 
trust’ 
 in WVS 1990 
Average years of schooling (2000) Pearson Correlation ,402(**) -,450(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,002 ,010 
  N 55 32 
Agricultural labor as % of total work force 
 (2000) 
Pearson Correlation -,136 ,403(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,260 ,013 
  N 71 37 
Service labor as % of total work force 
(2000) 
Pearson Correlation ,323(**) -,430(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,007 ,011 
  N 68 34 
Percentage  urban population (2000) Pearson Correlation ,116 -,353(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,335 ,030 
  N 71 38 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-
tailed). 
 
 
5.6.4 Increased reliance on society and decreased dependence on family 
and kin.  
As predicted do most ‘defamilization ’ aspects of modernization correlate positively with 
‘Generalized trust’ and negatively with ‘Particularized trust’. ‘Gender equality index’ is the 
most precise predictor of ‘Generalized’ (r -,685) and ‘Particularized’ (r -,538) trust. 
However, divorce rate, which might be argued, is the prime example of ‘defamilization’ is 
not significantly correlated with trust.  
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Table 13. Correlations between trust and ‘Defamilization’ and female emancipation 
 
  ‘Generalized 
trust’ 
in WVS 2000 
‘Particularized 
trust’ 
in WVS 1990 
Defamilizationindex  
-female labour participation, -duration of  
compensated maternity leave, -maternity leave  
compensation (% of pay) -female wage  
percentage of male. 2000  
 
Pearson Correlation 
,492(*) -,265 
 Sig. (2-tailed) ,038 ,360 
 N 18 14 
Female employment rate (2000) Pearson Correlation ,630(**) -,588(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,003 
  N 30 24 
Percentage women in tertiary education (1990) Pearson Correlation ,142 ,467(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,324 ,008 
  N 50 31 
Percentage women in professional/technical jobs 
(1998) 
Pearson Correlation -,160 -,216 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,263 ,244 
  N 51 31 
Percentage women in parliament (1998) Pearson Correlation ,617(**) -,382(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,020 
  N 67 37 
Divorce per capita (1990) 
  
  
Pearson Correlation 
,238 -,208 
 Sig. (2-tailed) ,093 ,245 
 N 51 33 
Gender equality Index 2000 
 % women in parliament, woman's professional  
participation , women’s share of income)  
Pearson Correlation 
,685(**) -,538(**) 
    
 Sig. (2-tailed) ,038 ,360 
Gender equality Index 1990’s 
% women in parliament, woman's professional  
participation , women’s share of income), means 
1992,1996, 1998, 2000 
Pearson Correlation 
,428(**) -,497(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,002 
  N 64 37 
    
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
When developing countries are excluded, the correlation between ‘Generalized trust’ and 
the Gender equality index of the 1990’s is remarkably strong at ,819r, 
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*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level(2-tailed). 
 
One reason for the weaker correlation when all 64 countries are included in the analyses is 
that the index includes ‘woman’s share of income’, an aspect of equality that third world 
countries (especially African) scores high on. A high share of earnings by women might 
reflect female empowerment but does not reflect ‘defamilization ’ as understood in western 
countries.   As indicated by the scatterplot in fig. 5, some third world countries weakens the 
correlation between ‘Generalized trust’ and the ‘gender equality index ‘of the 1990’s.  
 
Table 13. continued.  ‘Generalized trust’ 
in WVS 2000 
‘Particularized trust’ 
in WVS 1990 
Gender equality Index 1990’s % 
women in parliament, woman's 
professional participation , women’s 
share of income) means of -92, -96,-
98,-00 
Pearson 
Correlation 
,819(**) -,419(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,024 
  N 37 29 
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As seen from this scatter plot is there a close relationship between ‘gender equality’ and 
‘Generalized trust’. The link is especially strong excluding the Asian outliers, high trust 
countries combined with a low score on the gender equality and the African .  Though it is 
difficult to determine to what extent gender equality/ defamilization has a causal effect on  
trust.  It might be the case that gender equality reflects values that also promotes 
‘Generalized trust’. 
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Percentage claiming ‘most people can be trusted’ in WVS 2000. Gender equality Index  
1990’s ( % women in parliament, woman's professional participation , women’s share of 
income, means 1992, 1996, 1998, 2000.  Country codes in appendix 1.    
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5.6.5 Secularization 
Comparing country means, the negative relationship between religiosity and ‘Generalized 
trust’ is quite strong, though correlations between ‘Particularized trust’ and religiosity are 
weak and not statistically significant. The proportion Muslims or protestants is however not 
a sign of religiosity but indicates a correlation between Muslim/ protestant countries and 
trust. 
Table 14. Correlations between Trust and religion/ religiosity variables 
  ‘Generalized 
trust’   
WVS 2000 
‘Particularized 
trust’  
WVS 1990 
% of respondents claiming ’religion is  
comforting’ WVS 2000 
Pearson Correlation -,605(**) ,270 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,101 
  N 57 38 
% of respondents identifying as a 
 ‘religious person’ WVS 1995 
Pearson Correlation -,579(**) ,187 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,382 
  N 42 24 
% of respondents attending religious services 
 once a week or more. WVS 1995 
Pearson Correlation -,481(**) ,142 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,001 ,490 
  N 43 26 
% Muslim population Pearson Correlation -,253 ,626(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,327 ,012 
  N 17 15 
% Protestant population Pearson Correlation ,712(**) -,399 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,059 
  N 38 23 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) **  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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The correlation of r-,605 indicates a relatively strong negatively link between ‘Generalized 
trust’ and ‘religiosity. There are no obvious outliers affecting the result. Though, India has a 
high percentage of ‘Generalized trusters’ considering their religiosity. At the other end of 
the scatterplott has France fewer ‘Generalized trusters’ than their (low) degree of religiosity 
would incline.     
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'Figure 7. Generalized  trust' and religiosity WVS 2000
Percentage claiming ‘most people can be trusted’ in WVS 2000. ’religion is comforting’ is aggregated 
 data from WVS question V.197 ‘Do you find that you get comfort and strength from religion?’   
Scale 0-1 = 0-100% of respondents. Country codes in appendix 1.    
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5.7  Intermediate political, institutional or cultural variables 
5.7.1 Equality 
Analyzing 73 countries the correlation between ‘Generalized trust’ in WVS 2000 and a gini-
index of income (mean of -90, -95, -99) is not overly convincing at 0,41 r. This relationship 
is however weakened by former east block countries. Excluding 21 former Soviet satellite 
states the correlation is .62 r (N52). I would argue that there are plausible reasons to exclude 
the former east block countries analyzing the effect of equality on trust. Due to there 
socialist legacy the former east block countries where, and to some extent are, equal in 
terms of income dispersion, though in a combination with authoritarianism the societal 
benefits of equality does not level out the negative aspects of authoritarianism.  
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     Figure 8. Generelized trust and Income equality 2000 
Dispersion in income, Gini index -90, -95, -99
Percentage claiming ‘most people can be trusted’ in WVS 2000. Gini index (means of -90, -95, -99) 
measures inequality over distribution of income or consumption. 0 = perfect income equality and 100 
=perfect income inequality. Source: UN-HDR 2001 table 12, 2004 table 14. Country codes in appendix 
2
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Other measurements of inequality confirm the negative relationship between ‘Generalized 
trust’ and inequality. The correlation between ‘Generalized trust’ and ‘share of the richest 
20% of the population to the poorest 20% of the population’ (how many times richer the 
rich are than the poor) is at ,44 r, (N 63) including former Soviet satellites and at ,57 r (N 
45) excluding former Soviet satellite states.     
As predicted, there is a negative correlation between equality and ‘Particularized trust’. The 
correlation between ‘Particularized trust’ and income distribution is  ,56 r (N 22).  
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Figure 9. ‘Particularized trust’ and income equality 1990
‘Particularized trusters’are respondents who trust his/ hers family and his/ hers countrymen 
‘completely’ but does not trust ‘most people’ in World Values Survey 1990. Gini index measures 
inequality over the distribution of income or consumption. 0 = perfect income equality, 100 =perfect 
income inequality. Source: UN-HDR 2001 table 12 and  2004 table 14. Country codes in appendix 2.   
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As indicated by the scatterplott this correlation should however not be over interpreted.  The 
correlation is based on relatively few countries and virtually non existent comparing western 
countries.    
 
5.7.2  The quantity and quality of welfare programs 
 
The size of the welfare state, measured as expenditures on social security in percent of GDP 
correlates with ‘Generalized trust’ at ,30 r. (N 58).    
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Figure 10. ‘Generalized  trust’ Social Security benefits 2000 
 
Percentage claiming ‘most people can be trusted’ in WVS 2000.  The ILO definition of social Security covers: 
medical care, child allowances and allowances for illness, unemployment, aged, disablement, pregnancy, 
invalidity, and war victims. It does not include education, or culture subsidies. Source: Veenhoven, R.,  
Country codes in appendix 1.    
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Excluding developing countries, analyzing 36 industrial countries   the correlation is 
strengthened to ,57 r.    
 
The correlation between ‘Particularized trust’ and the quantity of welfare programs is -,41 
(N=30) 
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Figure 11. ‘Particularized trust’ and Social Security benefits 1990
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‘Particularized trusters’are respondents who trust his/ hers family and his/ hers countrymen ‘completely’ but 
does not trust ‘most people’ in World Values Survey 1990. The ILO definition of social Security covers: 
medical care, child allowances and allowances for illness, unemployment, aged, disablement, pregnancy, 
invalidity, and war victims. It does not include education, or culture subsidies. Country codes in appendix 2.    
 79
-Quality of welfare programs.  
Due to a shortage of comparative data on the quality of welfare programs, the statistical 
analysis should not be over interpreted and is merely included as an indication. The 
‘quality’ of welfare state is operationalized using Esping-Andersens variables from The 
three Worlds of Welfare Capaitalism,, ‘decomodification index’30, ‘program universalism’31 
and ‘percentage means-tested poor-relief’32,  though with data for only 16 countries only one 
aspect,  ‘program universalism’  has an statistically significant effect on ‘Generalized trust’, 
r ,58.  
There were no significant correlations between ‘Particularized trust’ and the quality of 
welfare programs (N= 14/15) 
 
5.7.3 Quality of government institutions and corruption 
As indicated by the correlations in table 16, is institutional quality and corruption linked to 
both ‘Generalized’ and ‘Particularized’ trust. The most commonly cited index of corruption 
from ‘Transparency International’ is used in a scatterplott indicating the same East Asian 
outliers; Iran, China, India and Indonesia. As indicated by the same scatterplott, the 
correlation among advanced industrial countries is strong though non existent among 
developing countries. Examining the scatterplot on ‘Particularized trust’ and corruption, 
former Soviet satellite states and some African countries have an outlier position. These 
countries have fewer ‘Particularized trusters’ than there relatively high level of corruption 
would incline. As discussed in the methodological chapter it is however difficult to establish 
what is the cause and what is the consequence. Is corruption and institutional ineffectiveness 
a sign of weak ‘Generalized trust’ or does corruption and ineffective institutions create 
distrust? 
 
 
                                                 
30 Unemployment Insurance; -replacement rate, -qualifying period, -duration of benefit, -waiting days -coverage ratio 
Sickness Cash benefit; -replacement rate, -qualifying period, -duration of benefit, -waiting days -coverage ratio 
Retirement Pensions; -minimum replacement rate, -standard replacement rate, -contribution ratio, -qualifying period, 
-coverage/take-up rate. For details see Esping-Andersen 1990 
 
31 Degree of program universalism as averaged percentage of population, 16-64, eligible for sickness unemployment, 
and pension benefits, and degree of equality in the benefit structure as an average for the above mentioned three 
programs in terms of the ratio of the basic level of benefits to the legal maximum benefit possible.  Esping-Andersen 
1990 s. 73 
 
32 Means-tested poor-relief as % of total public social expenditure, Esping-Andersen 1990, s. 73 
 80
Table 15. Correlations between trust and institutional quality/ corruption 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
                                                 
33 Index of  -voice and accountability, -political instability and violence, -government effectiveness, -regulatory burden, 
-rule of law, -graft, based on various sources, e.g. surveys among businessmen, IMF 2000, / Veenhoven, R. 
34 Aggregation of subjective assesments. Includes indicators which measure the extent to which respondents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society; perceptions of the incidence of both violent and non-violent crime, the 
effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary and the enforceability of contracts. Kaufmann c.s. 1998 , /Veenhoven, 
R. 
35 Aggregation of subjective assesments. Combines perceptions of the quality of public service provision, the quality of 
the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of civil service from political pressure, and the 
credibility of the government’s commitment to policies into a single grouping. The main focus of this index is on inputs 
required for the government to be able to produce and implement good policies and deliver public goods. Kaufmann c.s. 
1999a, World Bank/ Veenhoven, R 
36 Researchers assesment. The ICRG staff collects political information converting these into risk points on the basis of 
a consistent pattern of evaluation. ICR 1996, / Veenhoven, R. 
37 Aggregated indicator, subjective assesments. Measures perceptions of corruption (drawn from different sources), 
conventionally defined as the exercise of public power over private gain; ranging from frequency of ‘additional 
payments to get things done’ to the effect of corruption on the business environment, of measuring ‘grand corruption’ in 
the political arena to the tendency of elite forms to engage in ‘state capture’. Kaufmann c.s. 1999a, / Veenhoven, R. 
38 A CPI 2002 score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, academics and risk 
analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). Combined surveys on perceived abuse of public 
office for private gain, for example, on bribe-taking by public officials in public procurement. The sources do not 
distinguish between administrative and political corruption. (Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 
2002/ State of Nations.) 
 
 
‘Generalized 
trust’’  
 WVS 2000 
‘Particularized 
trust’’’ 
 WVS 1990 
Institutional quality, 1997-98 33 Pearson 
Correlation ,288(*) -,380(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,015 ,021 
  N 71 37 
Rule of law, 199834 Pearson 
Correlation ,456(**) -,271 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,116 
  N 70 35 
Government effectiveness, 199835 Pearson 
Correlation ,442(**) -,390(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,021 
  N 70 35 
Corruption in Government, 1982-199536 Pearson 
Correlation -,510(**) ,470(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,008 
  N 49 31 
Control of Corruption, 199837 Pearson 
Correlation ,456(**) -,353(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,037 
  N 70 35 
Transparency International’s Corruption  
Perceptions Index 199838 
Pearson 
Correlation -,559(**) ,392(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,014 
  N 65 39 
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Figure 12. ‘Generalized  trust’ 2000 and Corruption 2002
Percentage claiming ‘most people can be trusted’ in WVS 2000. Notes on Transparancy Int. 
Corruption perception index see table 15.   Country codes in appendix 2.    
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5.7.4 Immigrant integration  
Comparing country averages, nor labor market immigrant or respondents feeling of 
discrimination is statistically significant correlated to ‘Generalized trust’. In contradiction to 
my hypothesis, the integration variables are positively correlated to ‘Particularized trust’. 
The better integration on the labor market the higher percentage ‘Particularized trusters’ and 
the lesser percentage respondents feeling discriminated the higher percentage ‘Particularized 
trusters’. Whether the hypothesis concerning immigrant integration is false or whether the 
variables chosen to detect integration are blunt, has to be further analyzed. Though, with 14 
and 18 countries the correlations are nevertheless statistically sensitive to outliers and 
deviant cases, and should not be over interpreted. 
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Figure 13. ‘Particularized trust’ 1990 and Corruption 2002 
‘Particularized trusters’are respondents who trust his/ hers family and his/ hers ountrymen 
‘completely’ but does not trust ‘most people’ in World Values Survey 1990.Notes on 
Transparancy Int. Corruption perception index see table 15.  Country codes in appendix 2.    
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Table 16. Correlations between trust and immigrant integration 
 
‘Generalized trust’   
WVS 2000 
‘Particularized 
trust’  
WVS 1990 
Immigrant integration on labor market 
(Ratio of % unemployment among immigrants  
and the whole population) 
Pearson  
Correlation ,197 ,696(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,433 ,006 
  N 18 14 
Member of a group discriminated against in this 
 country, (WVS respondents assessment)  
Pearson 
 Correlation -,149 -,792(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,499 ,000 
  N 23 18 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Figure 14. ‘Particularized trust’ and immigrant integration 1990/ 2000
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‘Particularized trusters’are respondents who trust his/ hers family and his/ hers countrymen ‘c
does not trust ‘most people’ in World Values Survey 1990. Ratio of % Unemployment  
among immigrants and % unemployment among the whole population 
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Figure 15. ‘Particularized trust’ and discrimination WVS/ESS 2000
‘Particularized trusters’are respondents who trust his/ hers family and his/ hers 
countrymen ‘completely’ but does not trust ‘most people’ in World Values Survey 
1990. Percentage of respondents claiming they belong to a discriminated group,  
Note. Rising percentage read from left to right 
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5.8 A regression of the effect of modernization, on trust. 
The model based on the hypothesis includes:  
-Modernization-index, 
-Gender equality index,  
-Percentage of respondents claiming ‘comfort from religion’, 
-Gini-index of income,  
- Expenditures on social security in percent of GDP, 
- Corruption perception Index.  
 
Since most aspects of modernization are inter correlated, they correlate with each other, it is 
difficult to statistically determine the direct effect of certain aspects of modernization. The 
fact that several modernization variables are inter correlated, e.g. that both gender equality 
and modernization-index correlates with each other (R ,803), does not have to imply that the 
correlation are  spurious. However, given the small number of countries with available data 
it is difficult to statistically determine (with significant results), what is a direct effect on 
trust and what is an indirect or spurious effect. In a combination with few observations (few 
countries with available data) even moderate multicollinearity renders statistical 
insignificance. Hence, the model does not include variables on; ‘immigrant integration’ and 
‘quality of welfare state’. These variables are excluded since data for these variables were 
only available for 16 countries.  
 
5.8.1’Generalized trust’ as the dependent variable 
Table 17. Linear regression of ‘Generalized trust’ 
Model R Square Adjusted R Square R Square Change N Sig. F Change 
1 (a) ,717 ,658 ,717 29 ,000 
a: Predictors: (Constant), Modernizationindex, Modernizationindex, Gender equality index (1990s), Comfort 
from religion in  (WVS 2000).  Gini-index of income (1990s), Expenditures on social security in percent of 
GDP (1996), Transparency Int. Corruption Perception Index 2002 
 
R Square ,717 indicates that the modernization variables can predict 71,7 % of the linear 
variation of ‘Generalized trust’ among 29 countries, all variables in the model are 
significant. More interesting is perhaps to see the change in R Square in a stepwise 
regression using the same variables. 
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Table 17. countinued  
Model R Square Adjusted R Square R Square Change N Sig. F Change 
1(a) ,232 ,209 ,232 34 ,003 
2 (b) ,471 ,439 ,239 33 ,001 
3 (c) ,630 ,595 ,159 32 ,001 
4 (d) ,639 ,592 ,009 31 ,391 
5 (e) ,660 ,603 ,021 30 ,184 
6 (f) ,717 ,658 ,057 29 ,022 
a:  Predictors: (Constant), Modernizationindex   
b: Predictors: (Constant), Modernizationindex, Gender equality index  
c: Predictors: (Constant), Modernizationindex, Gender equality index, Comfort from religion.  
d: Predictors: (Constant), Modernizationindex, Gender equality index, Comfort from religion.  Gini-index of 
income (1990s)  
e:  Predictors: (Constant), Modernizationindex, Modernizationindex, Gender equality index, Comfort from 
religion.  Gini-index of income (mean of -90, -95, -99), expenditures on social security in percent of GDP 
(1996) 
f:  Predictors: (Constant), Modernizationindex, Modernizationindex, Gender equality index, Comfort from 
religion.  Gini-index of income (mean of -90, -95, -99), expenditures on social security in percent of GDP 
(1996), Transparency Int. Corruption Perception Index 2002 
 
 
As indicated by the stepwise regression the modernization index explains 23.2% of the 
variance of ‘Generalized trust’ among countries. This percentage increases sharply when 
‘gender equality’ is included in the regression analyses. An total R square of ,717 for the 
model, indicates a strong link between modernization/ intermediate variables and 
‘Generalized trust’. The increase in R Square from .232 to .717 indicates that ‘gender 
equality’ and the intermediate variables have a strong effect. Though, due to 
multicollinearity the importance of each variable separately can not be analyzed, or in other 
words the effect of ‘Model’ 2- 6 has to be cautiously interpreted in this regression. Model nr 
4 (income distribution added) and 5 (expenditure on social security added) is not significant 
(sig. ,391 resp. ,184). Both the R square and the statistical significance of the variables are 
to a large degree decided by the sequence they are entered in the regression analyses.  
 
5.8.2 ‘Particularized trust’ as the dependent variable  
In a regression analyses with ‘Particularized trust’ as the dependent variable, R square is 
.518, hence the model explains 51.8 % of the linear variance of ‘Particularized trust’ in 21 
countries. While the model as a whole is significant, the only single variable being 
significant is ‘Comfort from religion’ (sig.073), indicating that there is a relationship. 
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Though, due to multicollinearity, and the limited number of countries analyzed, the 
importance of each variable can not be estimated.   
 
 
The linear regression in the preceding chapter indicated that only some of the variation in 
trust could be attributed to modernization variables but a much greater part could be 
attributed to the intermediate variables.  
 
 
5.9. Summary of statistical analyses 
Since the result of this multi level statistical analysis might be difficult to comprehend, a 
summary is needed. I will here summarize findings relevant to each hypothesis.  
 
-Hypotheses: ‘Material needs satisfaction renders an increase in ‘Generalized 
trust and an decrease in  ‘Particularized trust’: 
 
Findings from the statistical analyses of both the individual level and country level 
strengthens the thesis of ‘material needs satisfaction’ as the basis of trust. At the individual 
level high income earners are more likely to be ‘Generalized trusters’ and less likely to be 
‘Particularized trusters’. At country level, rich countries have more ‘Generalized trusters’ 
and fewer ‘Particularized trusters’. There are however indications that the link between 
wealth and trust is not a linear relation. Since respondents from ‘upper medium income 
countries’ are more likely to be Generalized trusters than respondents from ‘high income 
countries’, there seems to be a diminishing return in the relation between wealth and 
‘Generalized trust’.  Analyzing the individual level data is it apparent that living in a rich 
(enough) country matters more than personal wealth.  
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-Hypotheses: The reduced dependence of family and kin and the increased 
reliance on the state renders an increase in Generalized and a decrease in 
Particularized trust. The change in dependence/ reliance is by it turn due to: 
 
 -Defamilization 
The hypothesis on defamilization  and family values/ situation is strengthened at both the 
individual and the country level. Patriarchal values are typical of the Particularized truster 
and atypical of the Generalized truster. Though, the respondents family situation seems to 
be irrelevant to both types of trust. Comparing countries, variables indicating defamilization 
is negatively correlated with ‘Particularized trust’ and positively correlated with 
‘Generalized trust’. As indicated by the linear regression of Generalized trust, 
defamilization or gender equality does appear to have an effect separated from other aspects 
of modernization (modernizationindex). The correlation coefficient of ,819 pearson’s r 
between ‘Gender equality index’ and ‘Generalized trust’ indicates an almost perfect linear 
relationship. I would argue that defamilization plays a key role in explaining changes in 
trust.  
 
-Diversification of workforce and education’  
The link between the diversity of workforce and trust is strengthened. As predicted, people 
working in diverse workplaces are more likely to be Generalized trusters and less likely to 
be ‘Particularized trusters’ compared to people working in none diverse workplaces e.g. 
agriculture. Countries with a high percentage employed in the service sector has a 
correspondingly high percentage ‘Generalized trusters’ and countries with a high percentage 
agricultural workers are more likely to have a large share Particularized trusters. The link 
between education and trust is even more robust. Though it might be argued that it is not the 
form of schooling, or conditions at the workplace, that promotes trust but rather a self 
selection process. People (or kids) brought up to trust chooses e.g. university education, 
while people brought up distrusting makes different ‘choices’.  
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-Urbanization 
The urbanization hypothesis is weakened in this analysis. In fact, people living in villages 
(<2000 inhabitants) are slightly more likely to be ‘Generalized trusters than metropolis 
dwellers. Though, in spite of popular belief, respondents from big towns are not less trusting 
of strangers (Generalized trust) than respondents from small towns. The supposed alienation 
of metropolitan dwellers is at least not expressed in distrust of strangers. At the country 
level are there no link between urbanization and ‘Generalized trust’, though, urbanization is 
weakly negatively correlated with ‘Particularized trust’.  
 
 
Hypotheses: Religion separates ethnic groups, and believers from nonbelievers, 
hence, secularization contributes to an increase in Generalized trust and a 
decrease in ‘Particularized trust’. 
 
The link between secularization and trust can not be affirmed nor dismissed. At the 
individual level, people finding ‘God very important’ are more likely to be ‘Particularized 
trusters’ and people belonging to the sectarian congregation of Jehovah’s witness are much 
less likely to be ‘Generalized trusters’. Except for frequent church visits, which is conducive 
to ‘Generalized trust’ were none of the other religiosity variables significant. The fact that 
members of a (at lest one) sectarian church proved to be less trusting than respondents not 
member of any church indicates that religiosity can have a bonding and exclusionary effect.  
 
Hypothesis: Increased equality of income and equality of opportunity generates 
‘Generalized trust’ and weakens ‘Particularized trust’.  
 
The hypothesis on equality is strengthened at in the country level analysis. Though, the 
results from the individual level analysis were more dubious.  Background variables, 
modernization, religiosity and family situation/ values held constant, are respondents from 
‘upper medium equality countries’ more likely to be ‘Generalized trusters ’ than 
respondents from ‘high equality countries. Another indication of the importance of equality 
is the fall in levels of ‘Generalized trust’ in the UK and USA, countries which has 
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experienced a fall in income equality during the last two decades. The Scandinavian 
countries and the Netherlands, which has experienced an increase in equality, has had stable 
or rising levels of Generalized trust during the same period39  
 
Hypothesis: An extensive and universal welfare state is conducive to 
‘Generalized trust’ and detrimental to Particularized trust. 
 
The hypothesis is strengthened, though due to the small number of welfare states the 
statistical analysis sensitive to outliers. Among industrialized countries with any kind of 
welfare state, the Scandinavian countries, all with a universal welfare state, has the highest 
percentage ‘Generalized trusters’. Countries with a conservative welfare state, mostly 
German speaking, has the lowest percentage ‘Generalized trusters’. Countries with a liberal 
welfare state, mostly Anglo Saxon, rank in between. From this analysis it is however not 
possible to conclude in which way or how welfare states affects trust. My proposal however, 
is that the effect of welfare states on trust  primarily is in reducing the importance of family 
and kin, or in other words ‘defamilization’ and not in reducing inequality. 
 
  Hypothesis: Fair and trustworthy government institutions and the absence of 
corruption nourishes ‘Generalized trust’ and weakens ‘Particularized trust’.  
 
The hypothesis is strengthened in this analysis. Among respondents from ‘developed 
countries’ does the odds of being a ‘truster’ increase sharply comparing respondents from 
‘medium corruption countries’ to respondents from low corruption countries. In the country 
level analysis all six variables on public and government corruption is clearly linked to both 
‘Generalized’ and ‘Particularized’ trust. I line with the argumentation of Rothstein, I would 
argue that the most demoralizing form of corruption is corruption in the judicial system.  
 
 
 
                                                 
39 Inequality data from Veenhoven, R 
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Hypothesis: A successful integration of immigrants is conducive to 
‘Generalized trust’ and is detrimental to ‘Particularized trust’.  
 
The hypothesis on immigrant integration is contradicted in this analysis. While there are no 
statistically significant results on the link between integration and ‘Generalized trust’ there 
is actually a positive link between a high degree of immigrant labor market integration and 
‘Particularized trust’. It can however be argued that integration of immigrants in the labor 
market does not reflect all aspects of integration but rather labor market flexibility.  
Though not affirmed in this analysis, I would say due to blunt variables, I do believe that 
there exists a trade off between trust and immigrant integration. Another conclusion is that 
an active, and politically motivated, integration policy might be less effective integrating 
immigrants than a flexible labor market. According to a recent EU study, ranking member 
states in immigrant integration policies, Sweden was the most integration friendly member 
state while Austria was the third least integration friendly40. This in contrast to the 
‘employment ratio’ variable, where Austria is among the best countries in employing 
immigrants and Sweden is among the worst countries (figure 13).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 Migrant Integration Policy Index, on: http://www.integrationindex.eu/ at 15.10.2007 
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6. Conclusions   
While some aspects of the hypothesis could not be affirmed and others where contradicted 
my general conclusion is that I have been able to show a relatively strong relationship 
between modernization and trust. Though, I would argue that the kind of modernization that 
has the strongest effect on trust is a form of modernization that is not easily tangible or 
measurable. This fact is not the least indicated by the strong unexplained effect of ‘country 
of residence’ in the individual level analysis. As Roland Inglehart (1997), I would argue that 
‘Generalized trust’ is in fact a post modern value, in line with other post modern values, 
such as the growing concern for the environment among ‘modernized individuals’. Though, 
I would argue that ‘post modern values’ are not only affected by economic and structural 
modernization but to a large extent also by political decision and culture. As such, the 
relative absence of trust among e.g. Italians can not only be understood in terms of 
structural modernization, but historical circumstances and culture has also to be accounted 
for. Explaining human activity, as e.g. the level of trust in countries, by culture, is 
controversial in current social sciences since cultural explanations carries a ballast of 
ethnocentrism, racism etc. 
  
Though, the adaptability and flexibility of human behavior indicates that neither societies 
nor individuals are doomed to an eternal state of mistrust. It would however be wishful 
thinking to expect that the historical experience of different societies does not give some 
societies a head start while it holds other societies back. As Putnam, I find it hard to believe 
that historical experiences of slavery or feudalism a few generations ago would not 
influence levels of trust and Social Capital today. Likewise, do I find it convincing that the 
‘historical experience’ of the universal welfare state will influence levels of trust and Social 
Capital among future generation Scandinavians. When scholars as e.g. Bo Rothstein, 
dismisses culture as an explanation to different levels of Social Capital, culture referred to 
as ‘origin’, I read a deterministic understanding of the concept of culture (2003a:194,224). I 
do not agree in that cultural explanations ‘reduce the agents to more or less, cultural or 
structural ‘dopes’ as Rothstein writes (2004b:5), nor that cultural explanations implies that 
certain countries has a ’path dependent’ future.  
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The high levels of Generalized trust in certain societies are, in my view due to 
modernization, as described and analyzed in this hypothesis, and partly due to historical 
experiences which has facilitated successful institution building. There is not something 
inherently trusting in ‘high trust’ societies, but rather a set of fortunate preconditions that 
has facilitated a culture of trust in these societies. 
The prevalence of free, self owned farmers over feudalism and slavery during the era of 
institution building is one such important historical background for the relative success in 
solving cooperative problems in Scandinavia. Self owned farmers were however rather a 
consequence of the incapability of rulers to exploit the masses in rural and inaccessible 
Scandinavia, than due to an inherently ‘free loving character’ of Scandinavians. Giving 
culture an explanatory value is not the same as explaining lack of Social Capital by ‘ancient 
traditions’ or ‘national character’. Claiming that historical experiences gives some societies 
a head start does not mean that culture alone is an satisfactory explanation for the stark 
variation of  trust today, nor does it rule out the role of institutions or distribution of power 
and wealth. 
 
The Putnam version of Social Capital has been promoted by scholars with a conservative 
agenda, since it is perceived to be the remedy for modern world human alienation. Market 
liberal scholars has also appreciated Putnam’s communitarian understanding of Social 
Capital since it gives reason to cut taxes and stop governments interfering in people’s daily 
life. Espen Hammer, professor of philosophy at the University of Oslo, gives us one reason 
for the appeal of ‘the Putnam Social Capital’; 
 
‘There is a conservative dream of the tightly knit fellowship, kept 
 together with large amounts of social glue. The more insecure 
 and alienated we get the more we long for it’ (2005:13) 
 
However, I believe that focusing on ‘the glue’ might be more harmful than beneficial in the 
diverse societies of the 21 century. While interactions mainly used to take place in between 
known others we are now increasingly dealing with unknown others. This is why 
impartiality and universalism has to rule out particularism and ethnocentrism. This crucial 
insight for the modern multiethnic society is expressed by Paul Seabright in  
The Company of strangers; 
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In a smoothly functioning modern society, you can trust me to transact reasonably 
with you not because of my character and  personality (about which you know little 
and care less), nor because you share my religion or my politics (which may repel 
you), nor because you know my family, but simply because of the social space we 
share. If it is to survive future challenges, such a social space needs constructions 
through institutions (including systems of education) that are blind to all the 
particularities of individuals except those that are strictly necessary for their 
interaction. In a word, it requires a degree of impartiality. (2004, s252) 
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Apendix 1.  
Interpretation of logistic regression table. E.g. table 1 is interpreted as this: An odds ratio41 
of ,928 indicates that women are slightly less likely than men (the reference group) to be 
‘Generalized trusters’ (,928 < 1, 1 would indicate no difference at all). An odds ratio ,729 
for respondents 15-29 years old indicates that they are clearly less likely than the 
respondents 30-49 years old (the reference group) to be ‘Generalized trusters’ (,729 <1).  An 
odd ratio of 1,171 indicates that respondents 50-69 years old are more likely to be 
‘Generalized trusters’ than the reference group of 30-49 years old (1,171 >1).   
 
Apendix 2. 
Country codes for interpretation of scatterplotts  
AFGHANISTAN AFG CZECH REPUBLIC CZE KIRIBATI KIR 
ALBANIA ALB DENMARK DNK KOREA, D.P.R.O. PRK 
ALGERIA DZA DJIBOUTI DJI KOREA, REPUBLIC OF KOR 
AMERICAN SAMOA ASM DOMINICA DMA KUWAIT KWT 
ANDORRA AND DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DOM KYRGYZSTAN KGZ 
ANGOLA AGO EAST TIMOR TMP LAOS LAO 
ANGUILLA AIA ECUADOR ECU LATVIA LVA 
ANTARCTICA ATA EGYPT EGY LEBANON LBN 
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA ATG EL SALVADOR SLV LESOTHO LSO 
ARGENTINA ARG EQUATORIAL GUINEA GNQ LIBERIA LBR 
ARMENIA ARM ERITREA ERI LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA LBY 
ARUBA ABW ESTONIA EST LIECHTENSTEIN LIE 
AUSTRALIA AUS ETHIOPIA ETH LITHUANIA LTU 
AUSTRIA AUT FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS) FLK LUXEMBOURG LUX 
AZERBAIJAN AZE FAROE ISLANDS FRO MACAU MAC 
BAHAMAS BHS FIJI FJI MACEDONIA MKD 
BAHRAIN BHR FINLAND FIN MADAGASCAR MDG 
BANGLADESH BGD FRANCE FRA MALAWI MWI 
BARBADOS BRB FRANCE, METROPOLITAN FXX MALAYSIA MYS 
BELARUS BLR FRENCH GUIANA GUF MALDIVES MDV 
BELGIUM BEL FRENCH POLYNESIA PYF MALI MLI 
BELIZE BLZ FRENCH SOUTHERN TERRITORIES ATF MALTA MLT 
BENIN BEN GABON GAB MARSHALL ISLANDS MHL 
BERMUDA BMU GAMBIA GMB MARTINIQUE MTQ 
BHUTAN BTN GEORGIA GEO MAURITANIA MRT 
BOLIVIA BOL GERMANY DEU MAURITIUS MUS 
                                                 
41 The odds ratio is a way of comparing whether the probability of a certain event is the same for two groups. An odds ratio of 1 
implies that the event is equally likely in both groups. An odds ratio greater than one, implies that the event is more likely in the first 
group. An odds ratio less than one imply that the event is less likely in the first group. The odds of an event happening is the 
probability that the event will happen divided by the probability that the event will not happen. An odds ratio is calculated by 
dividing the odds in group 1 by the odds in group 2. 
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BOSNIA AND HERZEGOWINA BIH GHANA GHA MAYOTTE MYT 
BOTSWANA BWA GIBRALTAR GIB MEXICO MEX 
BOUVET ISLAND BVT GREECE GRC 
MICRONESIA, FEDERATED STATES 
OF FSM 
BRAZIL BRA GREENLAND GRL MOLDOVA, REPUBLIC OF MDA 
BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN 
TERRITORY IOT GRENADA GRD MONACO MCO 
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM BRN GUADELOUPE GLP MONGOLIA MNG 
BULGARIA BGR GUAM GUM MONTSERRAT MSR 
BURKINA FASO BFA GUATEMALA GTM MOROCCO MAR 
BURUNDI BDI GUINEA GIN MOZAMBIQUE MOZ 
CAMBODIA KHM GUINEA-BISSAU GNB MYANMAR (Burma) MMR 
CAMEROON CMR GUYANA GUY NAMIBIA NAM 
CANADA CAN HAITI HTI NAURU NRU 
CAPE VERDE CPV HEARD AND MC DONALD ISLANDS HMD NEPAL NPL 
CAYMAN ISLANDS CYM HOLY SEE (VATICAN CITY STATE) VAT NETHERLANDS NLD 
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CAF HONDURAS HND NETHERLANDS ANTILLES ANT 
CHAD TCD HONG KONG HKG NEW CALEDONIA NCL 
CHILE CHL HUNGARY HUN NEW ZEALAND NZL 
CHINA CHN ICELAND ISL NICARAGUA NIC 
CHRISTMAS ISLAND CXR INDIA IND NIGER NER 
COCOS (KEELING) ISLANDS CCK INDONESIA IDN NIGERIA NGA 
COLOMBIA COL IRAN (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF) IRN NIUE NIU 
COMOROS COM IRAQ IRQ NORFOLK ISLAND NFK 
CONGO COG IRELAND IRL NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS MNP 
CONGO, THE DRC COD ISRAEL ISR NORWAY NOR 
COOK ISLANDS COK ITALY ITA OMAN OMN 
COSTA RICA CRI JAMAICA JAM PAKISTAN PAK 
COTE D'IVOIRE CIV JAPAN JPN PALAU PLW 
CROATIA (local name: 
Hrvatska) HRV JORDAN JOR PANAMA PAN 
CUBA CUB KAZAKHSTAN KAZ PAPUA NEW GUINEA PNG 
CYPRUS CYP KENYA KEN PARAGUAY PRY 
PERU PER SLOVENIA SVN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO TTO 
PHILIPPINES PHL SOLOMON ISLANDS SLB TUNISIA TUN 
POLAND POL SOMALIA SOM TURKEY TUR 
PORTUGAL PRT SOUTH AFRICA ZAF TURKMENISTAN TKM 
PUERTO RICO PRI SPAIN ESP TUVALU TUV 
QATAR QAT SRI LANKA LKA UGANDA UGA 
ROMANIA ROM ST. HELENA SHN UKRAINE UKR 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION RUS SUDAN SDN UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ARE 
RWANDA RWA SURINAME SUR UNITED KINGDOM GBR 
SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS KNA SWAZILAND SWZ UNITED STATES USA 
SAMOA WSM SWEDEN SWE URUGUAY URY 
SAN MARINO SMR SWITZERLAND CHE UZBEKISTAN UZB 
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE STP SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC SYR VANUATU VUT 
SAUDI ARABIA SAU TAIWAN, PROVINCE OF CHINA TWN VENEZUELA VEN 
SENEGAL SEN TAJIKISTAN TJK VIET NAM VNM 
SEYCHELLES SYC TANZANIA, UNITED REPUBLIC OF TZA WESTERN SAHARA ESH 
SIERRA LEONE SLE THAILAND THA YEMEN YEM 
SINGAPORE SGP TOGO TGO 
YUGOSLAVIA  (Serbia and 
Montenegro) YUG 
SLOVAKIA (Slovak Republic) SVK TONGA TON ZAMBIA ZMB 
    ZIMBABWE  ZWE 
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